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MEASURING CHANGE: FROM RATES OF 
RECIDIVISM TO MARKERS OF 
DESISTANCE 
CECELIA KLINGELE* 
Reducing the incidence of crime is a primary task of the criminal justice 
system and one for which it rightly should be held accountable.  The system’s 
success is frequently judged by the recidivism rates of those who are subject 
to various criminal justice interventions, from treatment programs to 
imprisonment.  This Article suggests that, however popular, recidivism alone 
is a poor metric for gauging the success of criminal justice interventions or 
of those who participate in them.  This is true primarily because recidivism 
is a binary measure, and behavioral change is a multi-faceted process.  
Accepting recidivism as a valid, stand-alone metric imposes on the criminal 
justice system a responsibility beyond its capacity, demanding that its 
success turn on transforming even the most serious and intractable of 
offenders into fully law-abiding citizens.  Instead of measuring success by 
simple rates of recidivism, policymakers should seek more nuanced metrics.  
One such alternative is readily available: markers of desistance.  Desistance, 
which in this context means the process by which individuals move from a 
life that is crime-involved to one that is not, is evidenced not just by whether 
a person re-offends but also by whether there are increasing intervals 
between offenses and patterns of de-escalating behavior.  These easily 
obtainable metrics, which are already widely relied on by criminologists, can 
yield more nuanced information about the degree to which criminal justice 
interventions correlate with positive (or negative) life changes.  They also 
resemble more closely the ways in which other fields that address behavioral 
change such as education attempt to measure change over time.  Measuring 
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the success of criminal justice interventions by reference to their effects on 
desistance would mean seeking evidence of progress, not perfection.  Such 
an approach would allow criminal justice agencies to be held accountable 
for promoting positive change without asking them to do the impossible, 
thereby creating new pathways by which the criminal justice system could be 
recognized for achieving real and measurable progress in crime reduction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. criminal justice system operates on an estimated annual budget 
of more than 180 billion dollars.1  At any given time, the system employs 
more than 870,000 police officers,2 32,800 prosecutors,3 an untallyable 
 
 1 John F. Pfaff, Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place, 45 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
571, 579 (2018); TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., JUSTICE EXPENDITURE 
AND EMPLOYMENT EXTRACTS, 2012-PRELIMINARY (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty
=pbdetail&iid=5239 [https://perma.cc/2T8H-ER4D]. 
 2 DUREN BANKS ET AL., NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2, T.1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EK8V-8742] (reporting on number of sworn state law enforcement officers); 
BRIAN A. REAVES, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 
(2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf [https://perma.cc/P62R-YKUX] 
(reporting 120,000 full-time federal law enforcement officers in 2008). 
 3 STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007—
STATISTICAL TABLES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 4, T. 3 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFJ2-JKXC] (reporting that 35% of the 77,927 people 
employed full-time by state prosecutors’ offices were chief or assistant prosecuting attorneys); 
Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking 
Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. 2087, 2088 (2009). 
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number of criminal defense attorneys,4 and over 502,000 correctional 
officials.5  It prosecutes more than fifteen million cases each year6, and 
imprisons or supervises more than 6.6 million people.7  Given the size of the 
criminal justice infrastructure, it is not surprising that policymakers and the 
public at large have pressed for more transparency about the effectiveness—
or ineffectiveness—of various criminal justice practices and programs.8  The 
 
 4 There is no direct estimate of the number of criminal defense lawyers in the United 
States, though the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys—a completely 
voluntary organization for private and public defense lawyers, and other interested 
stakeholders—boasts over 40,000 members. Nat’l Assoc. Crim. Def. Lawyers, About NACDL, 
https://www.nacdl.org/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/22QX-8KYP]. Estimates suggest that in 
2008, state and county indigent defense agencies employed more than 15,000 criminal defense 
attorneys. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 3 T.1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9Q5-CSSZ]. The nation’s 94 federal judicial districts employ more than 
12,000 panel attorneys under the Criminal Justice Act and maintain a combined lawyer and 
support staff of more than 3,700 people. DEFENDER SERVICES, U.S. COURTS, http://www.
uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services [https://perma.cc/4RPV-FUV4]. 
 5 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AND JAILERS, MAY 2018, https:
//www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes333012.htm#(1) [https://perma.cc/PY8L-WDTW]; BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, PROBATION OFFICERS AND CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT SPECIALISTS, MAY 
2018, https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes211092.htm#st [https://perma.cc/5K7D-EKWT] 
(reporting 87,660 jobs in 2018). 
 6 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://
perma.cc/T8Q4-2XP4] (last visited May 5, 2019) (showing 81,553 newly-filed criminal cases 
in 2018); R. Schauffler et al., ed., Court Statistics Project DataViewer, COURT STATISTICS 
PROJECT (Jan. 11, 2017), www.courtstatistics.org [https://perma.cc/5EMT-CFUT] (last visited 
May 5, 2019) (reporting 15,125,229 new criminal cases filed in 2017 in 40 states and the 
District of Columbia). 
 7 DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2016, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QWM5-3D3V]. 
 8 See, e.g., Josh Salman, ‘A Game-Changer’: Florida House Passes Criminal Justice 
Reform Bill: Newspaper Series on Sentencing Disparities Got Ball Rolling on Legislation, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (Feb. 22, 2018), http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20180222/
a-game-changer-florida-house-passes-criminal-justice-reform-bill [https://perma.cc/9SRB-C
KQS] (last visited May 5, 2019) (reporting on new law to make criminal justice data more 
transparent as a result of media reporting on data inaccuracies and racial disparities in 
sentencing); Mike Nerheim & Meg Reiss, The Criminal Justice System Needs to Start 
Learning from Its Mistakes, THE HILL (Nov. 18, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-
justice/360969-the-criminal-justice-system-needs-to-start-learning-from-its [https://perma.cc
/YU2R-ZC93] (last visited May 5, 2019) (“As democratically elected officials, prosecutors’ 
legitimacy is premised on public trust. Although they are tasked with holding people 
accountable, they are rarely held accountable . . . . In order to actively build public trust and 
foster public safety, prosecutors should scrutinize existing systems that allow any wrongdoing 
or practice to occur . . . and support implementing processes and procedures that enhance 
transparency of and accountability for their decisions.”); David A. Graham, What Can the U.S. 
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fundamental question is whether the system is worth its significant costs in 
both resources and human lives. 
While demands for accountability are both prudent and fair, 
determining how to measure effectiveness is difficult.  Whether the focus of 
evaluation is on the success of system actors (such as police, prosecutors, or 
judges), participants (such as arrestees, defendants, or prisoners), or specific 
interventions (such as drug courts, probation supervision, or restorative 
justice programs); it is not always clear how success should be defined or 
measured.  If the goal of the criminal justice system is to advance public 
safety and promote proportional accountability for wrongdoing,9 then the 
best metrics would be those that reveal how well system actors prevent 
criminal harm or restore community confidence that justice has been served.  
Such outcomes are difficult to quantify, however, and policy analysts often 
default to measurements that are easier to gather: number of arrests made, 
amount of restitution collected, or number of convictions secured.10 
Those within the criminal justice system and those outside it rely 
heavily on another measure of success: rates of recidivism.  Recidivism rates 
are one of the primary ways that legislators, policymakers, grant funders, 
media outlets, and criminal justice system actors determine whether specific 
criminal justice interventions have succeeded or failed.11  As Joan Petersilia 
wrote in her authoritative article on recidivism: 
 
Do to Improve Police Accountability?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2016/03/police-accountability/472524/ [https://perma.cc/96M8-R24G] 
(last visited May 5, 2019) (“The lack of reliable information on policing has been a major 
hindrance to discussions.”). 
 9 There are, of course, many purposes to the criminal justice system. See generally H. L. 
A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968). Some of these exist in tension 
with each other, and others co-exist more comfortably. See, e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., 
Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 284 (2002) (discussing tensions between retributive and 
deterrent philosophies of punishment). Among the most traditionally recognized of these are 
the need for public protection and the desire to hold offenders morally accountable for their 
willful wrongdoing. See generally Michael Tonry, Thinking About Punishment, in WHY 
PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
 10 Cf. Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 995 
(2010) (“Agencies like quantifiable statistics, and prevention is notoriously difficult to 
quantify.”). 
 11 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81w(b) (2007) (“The success of the reentry 
strategy shall be measured by: (1) The rates of recidivism and community 
revictimization . . . .”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 509.003(a)(3) (2015) (“The [Community Justice 
Assistance Division] shall propose and the board shall adopt reasonable rules 
establishing . . . methods for measuring the success of community supervision and corrections 
programs, including methods for measuring rates of diversion, program completion, and 
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Defining and measuring recidivism are . . . central to answering the question “How 
well are we doing?” It has been said that recidivism rates are to the criminologist what 
the Geiger counter is to the geologist. In other words, they are the most objective overall 
basis we have for evaluating the performance of justice agencies.12 
While criminologists have developed nuanced ways of gathering and 
interpreting recidivism data, criminal justice agencies typically examine 
recidivism rates in isolation from other available measures of success.13  On 
its face, recidivism seems a sensible metric: re-offense is what recidivism 
rates purport to measure, and a reduction in crime is undeniably a primary 
goal of the criminal justice system.  Moreover, when a convicted person does 
 
recidivism.”); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 64-13-25(4)(a) (2015) (“The department shall 
collaborate with the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health to develop and 
coordinate the performance goals and outcome measurements, including recidivism rates and 
treatment success and failure rates.”); Alana Saulniera & Diane Sivasubramaniam, Restorative 
Justice: Underlying Mechanisms and Future Directions, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 510, 516 
(2015) (“Rates of recidivism are perhaps considered the ultimate measure of success and are 
one of the most frequently compared outcomes of restorative and retributive procedures.”); 
Kevin Rector, Justice Department Gives Baltimore Police $750,000 Grant to Fight 
Recidivism, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 28, 2017 https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-
md-ci-doj-recidivism-grant-20170928-story.html [https://perma.cc/CN3V-KC28]; NAT’L 
REENTRY RESOURCE CENTER, SECOND CHANCE ACT STATEWIDE RECIDIVISM REDUCTION 
PROGRAM https://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/second-chance-act-recidivism-reduction-grant-
program/ [https://perma.cc/74ZZ-SDXC] (last visited May 5, 2019) (“Among the most critical 
priorities for . . . grant recipients is to implement evidence-based practices and core 
correctional practices . . . . States that receive SRR grants utilize the funds to pursue an 
intensive, collaborative process that brings the governor’s office, state policymakers, and 
corrections leaders together to set measurable recidivism-reduction goals and develop 
practical, data-driven plans to achieve them.”). 
 12 Joan Petersilia, Recidivism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 382, 382 (Marilyn 
D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996) (citing Korn and McCorkle 24 (1966)); see 
also Janet L. Jackson et al., A Critical Look at Research on Alternatives to Custody, 59 FED. 
PROB. 43, 44–45 (1995) (“A considerable number of empirical studies comparing the 
effectiveness of different sanctions are to be found in the literature. . . . Although other aspects 
have been considered by some researchers, in general, recidivism has been the most important 
and frequently exclusive indicator of effectiveness.”). 
 13 See, e.g., CENTER FOR STATE GOVERNMENTS, REDUCING RECIDIVISM: STATES DELIVER 
RESULTS (2017) https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/6.12.17_Reducing-
Recidivism_States-Deliver-Results.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM43-ZDDV] (reporting on 
cohort-based and revocation-based recidivism for seven states); NANCY LA VIGNE ET AL., 
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDEBOOK, 
URB. INST. (2010), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412233-Justice-Reinvestment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/78DH-SDK2]; COUNCIL OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS 
DEFINING AND MEASURING RECIDIVISM (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abst
ract.aspx?ID=259797 [https://perma.cc/6XFP-QS7F]; Martha Lyman & Stefan LoBuglio, 
‘Whys’ and ‘Hows’ of Measuring Jail Recidivism, AM. JAILS 9 (Mar./Apr. 2007), https://www.
montgomerycountymd.gov/COR/Resources/Files/PDF/jail_recidivism.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2A4H-FN7J] 
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not offend again, that is a success.  Even so, there is a difference between 
commending those who abandon crime entirely—whether by virtue of a 
criminal justice intervention or otherwise—and saying that the criminal 
justice system fails whenever it does not fully transform law-breakers into 
models of perfect compliance. 
One problem with recidivism is that it is a binary measure: either a 
person commits a new crime, or he does not.  Absent from data that measure 
rates of recidivism is an appreciation for the nuances of human behavioral 
change.  The addict who stops selling drugs (but shoplifts a few canned 
goods) and the batterer who again assaults his wife are both “recidivists,” but 
there is a clear distinction between them.  Recidivism as a metric is not 
sensitive to reductions in the severity or frequency of offending, even though 
such reductions often serve as markers of progress and indicate a reduction 
in harm caused to the community.14  By over-relying on recidivism rates to 
gauge success, policymakers and system actors alike risk underappreciating 
change by individual defendants and undervaluing the criminal justice 
interventions that move people forward.  Moreover, by looking only at 
whether past offenders have recidivated, rather than at how often and in what 
ways they recidivate, system actors risk missing clues about escalating 
dangers or underestimating the harm inflicted by ill-conceived interventions. 
So, how should success and failure be measured when it comes to the 
criminal justice system and those in it? Much of that depends on what we are 
trying to measure and what resources we have available to capture data.  
While there are many ways to gauge individual and programmatic success,15 
this Article focuses on one particularly simple alternative to recidivism: 
markers of desistance. 
Criminologists have long studied what makes people stop committing 
crimes.  Studies have examined youth and adults at various life stages and 
have identified a myriad psychological, social, physical, and environmental 
factors that are correlated with desistance16—that is, the process by which 
people disentangle themselves from criminal behavior and connect to 
 
 14 See infra Section III.A. 
 15 These include examining individuals’ pre and post-intervention health, substance abuse 
rates, economic prosperity, community engagement, and self-reported satisfaction with 
programs and program staff. Cf. Brandy L. Blasko et al., Performance Measures in 
Community Corrections: Measuring Effective Supervision Practices with Existing Agency 
Data, 80 FED. PROB., 3, 26, 28 (2016) (advocating for an examination of factors such as 
supervisees’ program engagement, negative drug tests, speed of referral, and level of 
supervision as important markers of success and failure for community supervision agencies). 
 16 See John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 17–25 (2001) (reviewing studies of correlates of desistance). 
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prosocial activities and associates.17  While the path to desistance is not 
always a straight one,18 the data by which sociologists track behavior often 
focuses on the severity and frequency of an individual’s criminal behavior.19  
Serious “persisters” can be identified by their often frequent involvement in 
crime and sometimes by an escalation in their offense severity.20  “Desisters,” 
by contrast, can be identified by their sometimes instant, but more often 
gradual, termination of criminal behavior.21  This more nuanced, academic 
approach to gathering and analyzing crime data has, for the most part, not 
translated into changes in the way criminal justice administrators measure 
and report rates of recidivism.22  
When desistance is discussed in the legal criminal justice literature, it is 
often used as an antonym for recidivism, rather than as a description of the 
process by which one progresses toward the end-goal of complete 
compliance with the law.23 
 
 17 Cf. id. at 11 (“Termination is the time at which criminal activity stops. Desistance, by 
contrast, is the causal process that supports the termination of offending.”); Shawn D. 
Bushway et al., An Empirical Framework for Studying Desistance as a Process, 39 
CRIMINOLOGY 491, 491–92 (2001) (“Most criminologists define desistance as the state of 
having ‘terminated’ offending. But recently, criminologists have begun to reexamine and 
expand the definition of desistance to include attention to the process by which people arrive 
at this state of nonoffending.”); Shawn D. Bushway et al., Desistance as a Developmental 
Process: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Approaches, 19 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 129, 
133 (2003) (defining desistance “as the process of reduction in the rate of offending from a 
nonzero level to a stable rate empirically indistinguishable from zero. The key to this definition 
is that it views desistance as a process, not a state”). 
 18 See generally Alex R. Piquero, Somewhere Between Persistence and Desistance: The 
Intermittency of Criminal Careers, in AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO 
OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 102 (Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004). 
 19 See Rolf Loeber & Marc LeBlanc, Toward a Developmental Criminology, 12 CRIME & 
JUST. 375, 409 (1990) (“[D]esistance concerns a slowing down in the frequency of offending 
(deceleration), a reduction in its variety (specialization), and a reduction in its seriousness (de-
escalation).”). 
 20 See Terrence P. Thornberry, Explaining Multiple Patterns of Offending Across the Life 
Course and Across Generations, 600 ANN. AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCI. 156, 159 (2005) 
(“[A]lthough some involvement in offending is common, relatively few offenders will have 
extensive criminal careers. Extensiveness includes such dimensions as frequency, duration, 
seriousness, and, especially, the co-occurrence of these dimensions.”). 
 21 See Loeber & LeBlanc, supra note 19, at 409. 
 22 See RYAN KING & BRIAN ELDERBROOM, IMPROVING RECIDIVISM AS A PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE, URB. INST. 2–3 (2014), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/UI-ImprovingRecidivis
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QDD-NSZC] (advocating for the broader use by administrators of 
some of the metrics used by criminologists, including time-to-new-offense). 
 23 See, e.g., Laub & Sampson, supra note 16, at 5 (discussing “conceptual issues” in the 
definition of desistance). 
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Some of the metrics gathered by criminologists—particularly intervals 
between offenses and offense severity over time—are easily ascertainable by 
reference to the recidivism data already collected and analyzed by the 
criminal justice system.  While such data remain an imperfect measure of 
change, utilizing these “markers of desistance” would enable policymakers 
and criminal justice stakeholders to develop a significantly more nuanced 
picture of offenders’ aggregate and individual behavioral change and of how 
criminal justice interventions positively and negatively affect that change.  
Rather than limiting the definition of “success” to those state interventions 
that (rather implausibly) claim to fully eradicate criminal behavior among 
some fraction of their participants, success should also be understood to 
include those programs that move people forward on the path of desistance.  
Similarly, by seeing desistance as a process, system actors might better 
discern both positive and negative behavioral changes in repeat offenders, 
allowing them to contextualize the statistical predictions of individual 
recidivism risk currently used by criminal justice agencies at all stages of the 
criminal process. 
This Article speaks broadly to criminal justice scholars, administrators, 
and stakeholders but especially to those who lack specialized training in the 
statistical methods used by criminologists to study recidivism and desistance.  
It explains to a legal audience the limitations of relying on recidivism rates 
as a measure of systemic or individual “success” and encourages the adoption 
of desistance over time as an alternative measure.  It does so for three reasons.  
First, it is relatively easy to do: markers of desistance can be easily derived 
from existing recidivism data.  Second, focusing on markers of desistance 
increases the system’s ability to accurately discern which criminal justice 
programs are improving offender behavior and which are causing greater 
harm.  Finally, training system stakeholders to see success in markers of 
desistance, and not just in the absence of recidivism, can shape the way 
judges, lawyers, and correctional administrators employ the recidivism risk 
prediction tools that are increasingly being adopted by criminal justice 
agencies. 
Part I describes the many ways recidivism is currently used to measure 
and predict the success or failure of programs and people within the criminal 
justice system.  Part II dissects the concept of recidivism, examining the 
many ways in which it has been defined and measured and translating for 
legal audiences the meanings of recidivism rates as they are reported by 
program analysts.  Part III explores how criminology and analogous fields 
understand the phenomenon of behavioral change and measure the success 
of programmatic interventions.  In light of the mechanisms of behavioral 
change discussed in Part III, Part IV examines the problems created directly 
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and indirectly by overreliance on recidivism data, including incentives for 
data gaming, the premature termination of otherwise promising programs for 
advancing public safety, and excessively risk-averse behavior by system 
actors.  Part V concludes with a call for change in how policymakers and 
criminal justice system actors think about and measure success in the 
criminal justice system.  It encourages administrators and policymakers to 
draw on markers of desistance to provide a significantly more nuanced 
picture of individual change over time, and of the role that criminal justice 
interventions may play in promoting or hindering that change process. 
I. DEFINING SUCCESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
It is easy to imagine any number of ways in which the effectiveness of 
the criminal justice system might be assessed.  Efforts could be undertaken 
to quantify reductions in crime24 or improvements in the degree to which 
people feel safe when going about their daily business.25  Policymakers could 
assess metrics of community health26 or the satisfaction of stakeholders, from 
crime victims to defendants.27  We measure what we value, and for that 
reason any metric we select is likely to tell us as much about those who 
operate the criminal justice system as it is to tell us about the effectiveness 
of the system itself.  While more robust metrics (like those listed above) are 
collected and analyzed in isolated instances, policymakers and criminal 
justice stakeholders tend to give minimal attention to measures beyond 
recidivism.28 
 
 24 Paul Ekbloma & Ken Pease, Evaluating Crime Prevention, 9 CRIME & JUST. 585, 643 
(1995) (detailing the challenges of quantifying the effects of crime prevention efforts, 
including problems with “[b]ackground fluctuation in the variables of interest, uncertainties 
in the interpretation of cause and effect, and vagaries in how programs are implemented are 
among the recurring problems”). 
 25 Wesley G. Skogan, Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder, and Fear, in 
MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE POLICING RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
MEETINGS, NAT’L INST. JUST. 37, 47–50 (Robert H. Langworthy, ed. 1999), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/170610.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G47-S28L] (discussing ways to measure fear 
of crime). 
 26 See, e.g., Susanne Mayer et al., Health-Related Resource-Use Measurement 
Instruments for Intersectoral Costs and Benefits in the Education and Criminal Justice 
Sectors, 35 PHARMACOECONOMICS 895 (2017). 
 27 See JULIAN V. ROBERTS, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32 
(2005) (“Confidence or trust has been measured using a number of different questions. 
Pollsters have asked questions that address issues of fairness and integrity, and ones that 
address issues of competence or effectiveness.”). 
 28 John J. DiIulio, Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: Toward a New Paradigm, in 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 
(1992) (“Rates of crime and recidivism have long served as critical measures for the 
performance of the Nation’s criminal justice system. These measures represent the basic goals 
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Recidivism data, both historic and predictive, are used to define success 
in multiple ways within the criminal justice system.  Some focus on 
individual defendants, as when judges or probation officers use actuarial 
instruments to predict particular defendants’ statistical risks of future 
recidivism.29  Others use recidivism data as “a policy outcome” to report on 
the success (or failure) of “new correctional or reentry experiments.”30  Still 
others assess the effectiveness of the criminal justice system as a whole, such 
as reports by state and federal justice departments that quantify recidivism 
rates for those exiting correctional institutions.31 
Governmental agencies are perhaps the largest consumers of recidivism 
data.  The website of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) proudly proclaims 
that “[r]ecidivism research is embedded throughout NIJ-sponsored research 
in sentencing, corrections and policy intervention evaluations.  Many NIJ-
funded studies of community supervision depend on recidivism measurement 
 
of public safety to which all components of the criminal justice system contribute. At the same 
time, however, rates of crime and recidivism are not the only, or necessarily the best, measures 
of what criminal justice institutions do.”). See Chris Cunneen & Garth Luke, Recidivism and 
the Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Interventions: Juvenile Offenders and Post Release 
Support, 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 198 (2007) (“[O]ur argument here is that 
[measures of recidivism] appear to now outweigh all other measures when considering the 
impact of particular criminal justice policies, programs and other types of interventions.”). 
 29 See, e.g., J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ind. 2010) (explaining that the function of 
LSI-R “is to supplement and enhance a judge’s evaluation, weighing, and application of the 
other sentencing evidence in the formulation of an individualized sentencing program 
appropriate for each defendant”); Jones v. Com., No. 2000-CA-001746-MR, 2003 WL 
21713776 (Ky. Ct. App. July 25, 2003) (“[S]exual-offender risk-assessment reports . . . are 
now conducted as part of a comprehensive pre-sentencing evaluation. The purpose of such 
reports [is] to provide the trial court with a recommendation assessing the defendant’s risk of 
re-committing a sex crime, the threat which the defendant poses to public safety, the 
defendant’s amenability to sex offender treatment, and the nature of the required treatment.”); 
State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) (discussing use of COMPAS risk assessment 
results at sentencing). 
 30 See Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures of Recidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 
788 (2014). 
 31 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION 2017 
OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT: AN EXAMINATION OF OFFENDERS RELEASED IN FISCAL YEAR 
2012–13 (2017), https://sites.cdcr.ca.gov/research/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2018/04/2017-
Outcome-Evaluation-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF2U-LKLZ]; RICHARD L. WIENER, UNIV. 
OF NEBRASKA LAW & PSYCH. PROGRAM, RECIDIVISM RATES FOR NEBRASKA ADULT 
PROBATIONERS: 2006 TO 2012 (2017), https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/sites/default/files/
recidivism-rates-adults-jan-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU6K-GKG2]; JOSEPH R. TATAR II & 
MEGAN JONES, RECIDIVISM AFTER RELEASE FROM PRISON, WIS. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS. 
(2016). 
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to inform probation and parole policy.”32  The federal Second Chance Act, 
which authorizes millions of dollars in grants to state governments and non-
profit service agencies assisting former prisoners, specifies that recipients 
must develop a “comprehensive strategic re-entry plan” that includes a 
measurable performance outcome of “reduc[ing] the rate of 
recidivism . . . by 50 percent over a 5-year period for offenders released from 
prison, jail, or a juvenile facility.”33  (In likely recognition of the 
implausibility of achieving such dramatic reductions, grant applications 
encourage applicants “to establish reasonable recidivism reduction goals for 
their state based on current conditions and drivers.”34)  Interest in measuring 
recidivism rates extends to juvenile justice, where programmatic success is 
also measured by reference to reductions in recidivism rates.35 
Private charitable foundations have similarly embraced the idea of 
recidivism as a reliable indicator of the success of criminal justice 
interventions.  The Bob Barker Company Foundation requires grant 
applicants’ work to “result in reducing recidivism.”36  The D.C.-based Morris 
and Gwendolyn Cafritz Foundation declares that its grants “ai[m] to reduce 
the recidivism rate of incarcerated youth and adults.”37  But private interest 
in reducing recidivism rates is not only philanthropic.  Increasingly, private 
funding in the form of social impact bonds is being used to fund programs 
designed to reduce recidivism.38  In this model, private investors agree to 
 
 32 NAT’L INST. JUST., WHY RECIDIVISM IS A CORE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONCERN, 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/core-concern.aspx [https://perma.cc/
HX9J-2KD7] (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 33 SECOND CHANCE ACT OF 2007: COMMUNITY SAFETY THROUGH RECIDIVISM 
PREVENTION, PUB. L. No. 110-199, § 101, 122 Stat. 664 (2008). 
 34 See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, Second Chance Act Statewide Adult Recidivism 
Reduction Strategic Planning Program FY 2017 Competitive Grant Announcement, 5–6, 
available at https://www.bja.gov/funding/SRR17.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQR7-6JFG]. 
 35 PHIL W. HARRIS ET AL., COUNCIL JUV. CORRECTION ADMIN., DEFINING AND MEASURING 
RECIDIVISM 1 (2009), http://cjca.net/attachments/article/55/CJCA-Recidivism-White-Paper.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CA42-GFGG] (“It is uncommon to conduct a program impact evaluation 
in juvenile justice without measuring recidivism. Despite challenges posed by definitional 
ambiguity and misuse of recidivism data, a program’s recidivism rate is generally regarded as 
the most critical indicator of program success to the widest audience.”). 
 36 Eligibility and Grant Process, Bob Barker Company Foundation, http://www.bobbark
ercompanyfoundation.org/grant-process/ [https://perma.cc/HW9A-PBSU] (last visited May 
5, 2019). 
 37 Apply for a Grant, Morris and Gwendolyn Cafritz Foundation, http://www.cafritzfound
ation.org/apply [https://perma.cc/P4A8-BMLA] (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 38 Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 187, 223 (2017); Kevin W. Humphries, Note, Not Your Older Brother’s Bonds: The Use 
and Regulation of Social-Impact Bonds in the United States, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 433, 
435 (2013). 
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fund programs that deliver quantifiable concrete public goods such as 
reduced rates of recidivism.39  If the programs are effective, as measured by 
their ability to meet measurable targets, then the investors are reimbursed, 
often at a profit to investors.40 
These pay-for-success (PFS) models have been used with some success 
in the United Kingdom, and have begun to gain traction in the United States 
as well.41  In an attempt to reduce recidivism, Goldman Sachs in 2012 
provided $7.2 million to create a cognitive therapy program for young people 
incarcerated on Riker’s Island in New York City.42  If the program succeeded 
in its goal of reducing recidivism by 10%, the city would reimburse the cost.43  
In that case, a follow-up study conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice in 
2015 found that the program did not measurably decrease recidivism at all, 
and the program was therefore terminated.44  In a different experiment with 
social impact bonding, New York State has partnered with private 
philanthropists at the Center for Employment Opportunities to provide job 
training and temporary employment for those leaving prison.45  If that 
program meets its five-year goal of achieving an 8% reduction in recidivism 
rates and a 5% improvement in employment rates, the government will 
reimburse the program cost.46  If the program exceeds its benchmark goals, 
investors will earn a profit.47  In both these examples, the pressure to reduce 
recidivism is extremely high, since large sums of money turn on the ability 
of the interventions to achieve their stated goals.48 
 
 39 Jo Max Liang et al., An Overview of Social Impact Bonds, 13 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 267, 
268 (2014). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 268, 278, App. A. 
 42 JIM PARSONS ET AL., VERA INST. JUST., IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE ADOLESCENT 
BEHAVIORAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE (ABLE) PROGRAM 23 (2016); Eduardo Porter, Wall St. 
Money Meets Social Policy at Rikers Island, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/29/business/economy/wall-st-money-meets-social-policy-at-rikers-island.html 
[https://perma.cc/4W3V-7ZGE]. 
 43 PARSONS ET AL., supra note 42, at 6. 
 44 Id. at 23. 
 45 Alana Semuels, A New Investment Opportunity: Helping Ex-Convicts, THE ATLANTIC, 
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/reducing-recidivism/
421323/ [https://perma.cc/UY4P-L67U]. 
 46 Id.; New York State Increasing Employment and Improving Public Safety, NONPROFIT 
FINANCE FUND (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.payforsuccess.org/project/new-york-state-increas
ing-employment-and-improving-public-safety [https://perma.cc/SE4S-PXN6] (last visited 
May 5, 2019). 
 47 Semuels, supra note 45. 
 48 See Jennifer Miller Oertel et. al., Proving That They Are Doing Good: What Attorneys 
and Other Advisers Need to Know About Program Assessment, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 693 (2013) 
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Recidivism reduction has attracted investors in more ways than one.  
Entirely apart from social impact bonds, private companies have begun to fill 
the growing demand for tools that can predict the risk that criminal 
defendants, probationers, prisoners, and parolees will commit future 
crimes.49  Peddling proprietary algorithms that purport to predict risk and 
identify individual treatment needs, private companies like Equivant 
(formerly Northpointe) are finding a profitable market as criminal justice 
stakeholders seek data to guide sentencing, supervision, and release 
decisions.50 Studies of these risk-and-needs tools vary in appraisals of their 
accuracy.  Some studies claim that the tools outperform human judgment in 
their predictions of future offending,51 and others claim that the tools increase 
pre-existing racial and class disparities in punishment without accurately 
sorting minor offenders from serious ones.52  However good or bad these 
tools may prove to be, their popularity unquestionably entrenches the fear of 
avoiding recidivism in any form.53 
 
(“Because often millions of dollars will hinge upon whether or not social outcome goals have 
been met, it is imperative that all parties understand social outcome measurement.”). 
 49 Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 167, 167 (2014) (noting “[u]nprecedented private sector involvement . . . in 
designing and marketing [risk prediction] instruments and providing services to 
government”); NATHAN JAMES, RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM, CONGRESS. RESEARCH SERV. 4 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44087.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EE9X-MVCM] (discussing the various points in the criminal justice system 
at which risk assessments can be utilized). 
 50 The most widely used proprietary tool is the Correctional Offender Management 
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, (COMPAS), sold by Equivant, and used by several states, 
including Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION 
CENTER, ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, https://epic.org/algorithmic-
transparency/crim-justice/ [https://perma.cc/CW89-CQXU] (last visited May 5, 2019). 
 51 See, e.g., Tim Brennan et al., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk 
and Needs Assessment System, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 21 (2009) (reporting favorably on 
results of a company-produced study of COMPAS accuracy). 
 52 See, e.g., Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting 
Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (2018), http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/advances/4/1/
eaao5580.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE93-MPNQ] (asserting that both COMPAS was no better 
than a randomly selected group of non-specialists at predicting future risk of recidivism); see 
also Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublic
a.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/V7MH-
W4CP] (purporting to find evidence of inaccuracies and racial bias in COMPAS results). But 
see Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A 
Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict Future 
Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks,” 80 FED. PROBATION 38, 44–45 (2016) (finding no 
evidence of racial bias in COMPAS results). 
 53 Alyssa M. Carlson, Note, The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive 
Sentencing Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 315–16 (2017) (discussing proprietary 
algorithm used in one such recidivism prediction tool, COMPAS). 
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The pressure to emphasize recidivism data has come from internal 
stakeholders, too.  The Conference of Chief Justices has promoted greater 
use of risk assessment tools asserting that “the best research evidence has 
shown that use of validated offender risk and need assessment tools is critical 
in reducing recidivism.”54  Taking an equally optimistic view, individual 
judges have also spoken in favor of greater attention to recidivism risks and 
rates.  Judge Roger Warren, for example, has advocated nationally for greater 
consideration of recidivism risks at sentencing and for using evidence of 
recidivism to evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs.55  His 
position turns in large part on an assessment that, unlike in decades past, 
social scientists now know enough about drivers of recidivism to reduce risk 
of future offense: 
Today . . . we know—based on meticulous meta-analyses of rigorously conducted 
scientific research—that unlike incarceration the right kinds of rehabilitation and 
treatment programs carefully targeted at specific crime-related risk factors among 
medium- to high-risk offenders can reduce offender recidivism by conservative 
estimates of 10 to 20 percent.56 
Judge Michael Marcus has similarly advocated for the broader use of 
recidivism risk assessment tools and greater attention to recidivism rates, 
optimistically asserting that properly-designed correctional programs “can 
hope to produce roughly a 30% reduction in recidivism among many 
common offenders.”57  He argues that because “the public is concerned, most 
of all, with how successfully [the criminal justice system] prevent[s] 
recidivism,” attention to recidivism risks and rates is an essential component 
of modern sentencing.58 
At times, academics have also embraced recidivism as a metric for 
success in the criminal justice system, albeit with some caveats.  Francis 
Cullen, Cheryl Jonson, and Daniel Mears recently suggested “recidivism 
reduction should be defined as the core goal of corrections, including 
community-based agencies.  Wardens, prison staff, probation and parole 
 
 54 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 752 n.1 (Wis. 2016) (citing CONFERENCE OF CHIEF 
JUSTICES, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS, RESOLUTION 12: IN SUPPORT OF SENTENCING PRACTICES THAT PROMOTE PUBLIC 
SAFETY AND REDUCE RECIDIVISM (2007), http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ/
Resolutions/08012007-Support-Sentencing-Public-Safety-Reduce-Recidivism.ashx [https://
perma.cc/UC99-WPAD] (last visited May 5, 2019)). 
 55 Roger K. Warren, The Most Promising Way Forward: Incorporating Evidence-Based 
Practice into State Sentencing and Corrections Policies, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 322, 324 (2008). 
 56 Id. at 323. 
 57 Michael Marcus, MPC—the Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk Assessment, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 751, 770 (2009). 
 58 Id. at 765. 
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chiefs, and officers should all be judged on whether offenders who pass 
through their organizations return to crime.”59  They argue that correctional 
officials should be held accountable for reducing recidivism in the same way 
“[s]ales managers each year are given goals, and profit margins are tracked 
carefully.”60  Why should corrections shoulder this responsibility? Because, 
they assert, “[a]t some point, community corrections is going to have to 
demonstrate its efficacy in reducing recidivism, or lose legitimacy.”61 
II. RECIDIVISM AS A SUCCESS METRIC 
Given the wide variety of ways in which recidivism measures and 
predictions are used to assess the success of criminal justice programs and 
the people upon whom they intervene, it is important to understand exactly 
what recidivism means.  Despite the criminal justice system’s heavy reliance 
on recidivism rates, there is surprising variation in how recidivism is defined 
and measured.62  Nevertheless, data purporting to track or predict recidivism 
is put to a myriad of uses, from deciding which treatment programs to fund 
to deciding what sentences to impose on individual defendants.63  The 
following subsections discuss in greater detail how recidivism is defined and 
measured in today’s criminal justice system. 
A. DEFINING RECIDIVISM 
Recidivism data attempt to quantify whether a person who has 
committed a crime in the past has gone on to commit another crime in the 
future.64  While the concept is simple, it is notoriously difficult to measure.65 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Francis T. Cullen et al., Reinventing Community Corrections, 46 CRIME & JUST. 27, 50 
(2017). 
 61 Id. at 49. Although Cullen, Jonson, and Mears embrace the idea of gathering and 
analyzing recidivism data, they also acknowledge that there are risks associated with 
emphasizing recidivism reduction, including the very real risk of data gaming. Id. at 51 
(“When accountability is heightened, strong incentives emerge to game the systems.”). For a 
full discussion on this point, see infra Section IV.A. 
 62 See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34287, OFFENDER REENTRY: 
CORRECTIONAL STATISTICS, REINTEGRATION INTO THE COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM 5–6 
(2015); URBAN INSTITUTE, MEASURING RECIDIVISM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: A QUICK GUIDE 1–
3 (n.d.), available at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/recidivism-measures_final-for-
website.pdf [https://perma.cc/36KA-R37C]. 
 63 See Weisberg, supra note 30, at 790–94. 
 64 Petersilia, supra note 12, at 382. 
 65 Weisberg, supra note 30, at 794–95 (“[T]here often are simply too many variables to 
account for, too many actors with too much and too many kinds of discretion, for us to 
confidently credit a deliberate program for a measured outcome.”). 
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The first challenge in quantifying recidivism is deciding what 
constitutes proof of a subsequent crime.  Most people do not boldly proclaim 
their criminal exploits, and instead seek to hide—or at least downplay—their 
involvement in illegal activities.  This basic fact makes formal detection (and 
therefore measurement) of criminal behavior difficult. 
The most effective way to measure behavior is through longitudinal 
studies.66  In such settings, researchers follow subjects over long periods of 
time—often decades—periodically surveying, interviewing, and gathering 
third party data about subjects’ behavior.67  Researchers conducting such 
studies provide participants with guarantees of confidentiality and other 
protections designed to reduce the risk that honest confessions about illegal 
behavior will result in consequences of any kind.68  Longitudinal studies are 
expensive and time consuming, however.  For these reasons, they are 
typically conducted by academic researchers, and not by criminal justice 
program analysts. 
Analysts who work within the criminal justice system are limited in 
ways academics are not.  They are frequently under pressure to produce 
assessment results in short periods of time and to satisfy funders, 
policymakers, and the public of the effectiveness of the programs they are 
assessing.69  Moreover, as state agents, they are not always positioned to offer 
 
 66 David P. Farrington, Longitudinal and Experimental Research in Criminology, 42 
CRIME & JUST. 453, 454 (2013). 
 67 Id. at 454–55; see also Loeb & Sampson, supra note 16, at 14 (analyzing evidence from 
the Glueck longitudinal study of delinquent youth conducted from 1939 onward); Mark Warr, 
Life Course Transitions and Desistance from Crime, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 183, 185–88 (1998) 
(discussing several longitudinal studies and analyzing data from the National Youth Survey, 
which collected data in 1976 and in nine subsequent waves thereafter, following participants 
from childhood through young adulthood). 
 68 Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are administrative bodies that are established to 
protect the rights and welfare of human research subjects. See Christine Tartaro & Marissa P. 
Levy, Criminal Justice Professionals’ Knowledge of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and 
Compliance with IRB Protocol, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 321 (2014). IRBs ensure that research 
on human subjects conducted by academic institutions and their affiliates complies with 
applicable federal regulations, as well as local statutes and policies. A common protection 
study participants receive is that all information collected by researchers shall remain private 
and confidential. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 241(d) (2012) (authorizing issuance of Certificates of 
Confidentiality, which allow researchers to refuse attempts to compel disclosure of participant 
information in legal proceedings); 45 CFR § 46.111(a)(7) (Health and Human Services policy 
requiring all federally funded proposed research to demonstrate adequate safeguards to 
“protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data”). 
 69 See Megan C. Kurlycheck et al., Long-Term Crime Desistance and Recidivism 
Patterns–Evidence from the Essex County Convicted Felon Study, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 71, 79 
(2012) (noting that in the majority of recidivism studies “follow-up periods are no more than 
a few years long”). 
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the same confidentiality protections researchers use to glean more accurate 
information about illegal behavior.70  Not that anyone within the criminal 
justice system regularly asks convicted people to provide such incriminating 
information: the limited resources of most agencies and actors within the 
system assure that the only recidivism data typically collected by state 
agencies draws from formal court or law enforcement records, rather than 
individual self-reports.71  The result is that while the criminal justice system 
purports to measure recidivism, what recidivism data usually measure are 
rates of re-capture—outcomes that turn as much on luck and policing patterns 
as they do on deviant behavior.72 
If recidivism rates are not being calculated based on longitudinal 
studies, then from what records are they produced? Four types of documented 
 
 70 For example, disclosures of past misconduct made by participants in sex offender 
programs operated by correctional facilities have sometimes served as the basis for later court 
proceedings against these program participants. Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender 
Exceptionalism and Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 984 (2011). 
This stands in contrast to the confidentiality protections that academic researchers must afford 
research subjects under Institutional Research Board (IRB) protocols. See generally Leslie E. 
Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting Human Subject Research Data in Law 
and Practice, 43 J. LAW & MED. ETHICS 594 (2015). The tension between the role of 
correctional agencies as executive branch law enforcers and their role as publicly-accountable 
agencies can create ethical tensions in how they conduct research—and, consequently, in how 
forthcoming their subjects are likely to be. 
 71 See Farrington, supra note 66 at 463 (reporting on results of a longitudinal study of 
youthful offenders that “found that the prevalence, frequency, and duration of criminal careers 
were all greater for reported offending than for arrests and that the escalation from minor to 
more serious crimes was greater for reported offending than for arrests”); James L. Johnson, 
Comparison of Recidivism Studies: AOUSC, USSC, and BJS, 81 FED. PROBATION 52, 54 
(2017) (“[A]ny definition will underestimate the ‘true’ recidivism rate, because rates are based 
on official criminal record data that only show crimes for which people have been arrested or 
convicted.”). 
 72 See Jaclyn Hovda, Note, The Efficacy of Idaho’s Domestic Violence Courts: An 
Opportunity for the Court System to Effect Social Change, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 587, 611 (2012) 
(“[W]hile a reduction in recidivism seems like an obvious metric by which the efficacy of 
D[omestic] V[iolence] courts could be measured, these rates can be deceiving because of 
chronic underreporting by victims.”). Because re-capture data are based solely on behavior 
detected by the criminal justice system, such data will necessarily be over-inclusive of the 
“failures” of heavily-policed communities and underinclusive of the failures of those whose 
behavior is not as closely surveilled. Given policing patterns in the United States, that suggests 
that recidivism rates may fail to reflect the behavior of under-policed members of society, who 
will be predominantly affluent and white. See, e.g., Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An 
Economic Analysis of Black-White Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop-
and-Frisk Program, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 315, 317 (2015) (discussing racial disparities in New 
York City street stops); Charles R. Epp et al., Beyond Profiling: The Institutional Sources of 
Racial Disparities in Policing, 77 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 168 (2017) (discussing racial disparities 
in vehicular stops). 
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events can be used as proxies for recidivism: arrest, charge, conviction, and 
revocation from community supervision.73  Some studies use only one of 
these measures, while others examine a combination of two or more.74  
Importantly, there is no national standard governing the choice of triggering 
events, and typically no standardization within a single state or county.75  
Comparing recidivism rates across programs or jurisdictions is therefore an 
often futile task, since each study provides a different measure of re-
offense.76  This lack of uniformity is particularly problematic given the 
different flaws inherent in each possible triggering event. 
 In some ways, arrest and charge data may get closer to capturing true 
recidivism data than conviction records can because they track events in 
which, at a minimum, the suspect behaved in a way that gave police or 
prosecutors probable cause to believe he had re-offended.77  These records 
are less likely than conviction records to be underinclusive of criminal 
behavior, although they are less comprehensive than self-reported data 
gathered by third-party researchers because they rely on official detection of 
deviant behavior, which invariably will miss many instances of illegal 
conduct. 
Arrest and charge data are not necessarily better than conviction data, 
since they risk being overinclusive.  Police may arrest the wrong suspect or 
may arrest for behavior that turns out not to be criminal at all once a full 
 
 73 Petersilia, supra note 12, at 383. 
 74 See generally Johnson, supra note 71, at 52 (2017) (comparing recidivism studies that 
use different measures); see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, 67 EMORY L.J. 
59, 76–77 (2017) (reporting on the markers of recidivism used by a variety of recidivism risk 
prediction tools). 
 75 See, e.g. Letter from Kamala Harris, Cal. Atty. Gen., to Public Safety Partners 1–2 (Oct. 
16, 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/Recidivism%20Definiti
on%20Letter%2C%20AG%20Harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/55U9-Z6CG] (observing that 
“California lacks any uniform or standard way to measure the rate of individuals who re-
commit crimes” and proposing a statewide definition of recidivism as “[a]n arrest resulting in 
a charge within three years of an individual’s release from incarceration or placement on 
supervision for a previous criminal conviction”); see also Phil W. Harris et al., Defining and 
Measuring Recidivism 1 COUNCIL JUV. CORRECTIONAL ADMINS. (2009) (observing that “using 
the average of state juvenile recidivism rates for a small number of states, the national juvenile 
rate could be anywhere between 25% and 55% depending on what measure of recidivism is 
used to comprise the measure”). 
 76 Petersilia, supra note 12, at 382 (observing that “recidivism data in one study are seldom 
comparable to the data in another”). 
 77 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975) (probable cause required to bring 
criminal charges); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (probable cause required 
for lawful arrest). 
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investigation has been completed.78  Charges may be brought against the 
wrong defendant or may not align with the actual behavior in which the 
defendant engaged.79  The fact that many of these cases do not proceed to 
conviction gives rise to doubt about whether a crime occurred at all or 
whether an error was made by system actors themselves.80 
Conviction data have the advantage of being the least overinclusive 
because they require that a defendant either admit to the charged conduct or 
be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  Nonetheless, conviction 
data have the distinct disadvantage of being underinclusive in many cases.  
Criminal cases may be disposed of pre-conviction for many reasons that have 
nothing to do with innocence.  Police error, prosecutorial resource 
constraints, policy choices, and difficulty developing evidence all can lead to 
dismissal of charges (or later acquittal at trial), even in cases when a 
defendant has actually committed a crime.81  As a result, while conviction 
data generate the fewest false positives among potential events suggestive of 
recidivism, they include an unknown and potentially significant rate of false 
negatives.82 
In addition to conviction, arrest, or charging data, many studies of 
recidivism also count revocation from probation or any form of post-release 
supervision as a triggering event.83  While incarceration is an important event 
to capture in recidivism data, individuals who are revoked from community 
supervision have not always committed a new crime.84  New criminal 
behavior can certainly trigger revocation (and often will) but so can so-called 
 
 78 Alfred Blumstein & Richard C. Larson, Problems in Modeling and Measuring 
Recidivism, 8 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 125 (1971) (“Whatever the choice [of 
recidivism metric], there are two types of errors: the Type I error of commission involves the 
erroneous counting as recidivists those who are improperly charged with recidivism . . . . The 
Type I error includes erroneous arrests, convictions, and sentences.”). 
 79 Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 
1, 41–42 (2000) (“Among the most commonly cited factors [for non-prosecution] are victim 
and/or witness reluctance, unavailability of prosecution or defense witnesses, and writs of 
extradition filed by other states. State prosecutors also report dismissals by courts due, in part, 
to ‘search or seizure problems,’ and legal issues relating to self-incrimination, speedy trial 
time restrictions, and the right to counsel.”). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Tayler Ruggero et al., Measuring Recidivism: Definitions, Errors, and Data Sources 3–
4, (Ctr. for Pub. Safety Initiatives, Working Paper No. 2015-03) (“The problem with using 
only reconviction rates is that not everyone is convicted for all crimes they have committed; 
authorities may not have become aware of the crime, or there may not have been enough 
evidence to prosecute.”). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 
104 GEO. L. J. 291, 295 (2016). 
 84 Id. 
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non-criminal violations, including absconding (that is, running away or 
persistently avoiding required supervision meetings), failing to attend 
mandated treatment programs, or failing to abide by restraint conditions, such 
as curfews, no-contact orders, and abstention from alcohol or other drugs.85 
Settling on what evidence proves recidivism is just the beginning of the 
ambiguity surrounding what it means to “recidivate.”  The next challenge is 
defining a follow-up period that meaningfully captures the effect of a given 
program on recidivism rates.  Due to system resource constraints and a desire 
for rapid feedback on the effect of various interventions, most studies on 
recidivism follow convicted individuals for only two or three years from 
conviction or from the completion of a sentence.86  A few employ a five year 
follow-up window.87  As a result, data currently gathered on recidivism 
provides a time-limited snapshot into the most recent behavior of convicted 
persons following sentencing or imprisonment,88 not a full picture of how 
convicted individuals go on to live their lives. 
To determine whether a person subject to a criminal justice intervention 
goes on to re-offend, perfect data would capture that person’s behavior for 
the remainder of his life—or at least until enough time has passed that he no 
longer remains at an elevated risk of committing future offenses.  Although 
individuals with prior records—like those without them—can commit 
 
 85 See generally Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1032–35 (2013). 
 86 See Kurlycheck et al., supra note 69, at 73 (noting that in the majority of recidivism 
studies “follow-up periods are no more than a few years long.”); see also David P. Farrington, 
Age and Crime, 7 CRIME & JUST. 189, 222 (1986) (“Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about termination [of offending] from information about recidivism because those 
who do not recidivate within two years include true desisters, undetected offenders, and those 
who will persist later.”). 
 87 Shawn D. Bushway et al., Connecting Desistance and Recidivism: Measuring Changes 
in Criminality Over the Lifespan, in AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER 
REINTEGRATION 85, 86 (Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004); Laura M. Baber & 
Mark Motivans, Extending Our Knowledge About Recidivism of Persons on Federal 
Supervision, 77 FED. PROB. 23 (2013) (reporting on a five-year recidivism study of people 
released from federal prison). 
 88 Recidivism data vary not only in definitions of recidivism and length of follow-up 
windows, but also in the start and end times of follow-up window. In order to assess whether 
people’s behavior has been altered by criminal justice interventions, it is necessary to study 
them when they are “at hazard” of detection and punishment. See Kurlycheck et al., supra 
note 69, at 72–79 (discussing methods of conducting long-term studies). While people commit 
crime in jails and prisons, as well as in the community, fewer opportunities exist in such 
closely-monitored environments. Consequently, follow-up studies for prisoners commence 
typically upon release from custody and not immediately following sentencing. See, e.g., 
Mariel Alper et al., 2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005-
2014) BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5X9-8D7G]. 
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criminal offenses spontaneously at any point in life, research suggests that as 
time without re-offense lengthens, the odds of recidivism diminish 
significantly.  Al Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura’s work on redemption 
has examined how long a person convicted of a crime must go without re-
offending before he or she obtains a predicted risk of future arrest no higher 
than that of a similarly-aged person in the general population.89  While the 
exact window varies based on the age of the convicted person and the type 
of crimes the person has committed, their research suggests that the average 
“redemption time” was between ten and thirteen years after conviction.90 
Blumstein and Nakamura’s findings suggest that a ten to fifteen year 
follow-up period would provide a thorough picture of the effect of criminal 
justice programs on long-term recidivism; however, a follow-up window of 
that length is beyond the capacity of most criminal justice agencies.91  The 
good news is that Blumstein and Nakamura’s work confirms what other 
studies have repeatedly found: the vast majority of those who recidivate do 
so within the first few years following release from custody.92  As time 
without re-offense lengthens, fewer people go on to recidivate at later points 
in time.93  For this reason, shorter follow-up windows will yield useful, albeit 
incomplete, information that can meaningfully capture the majority of those 
who recidivate following any given intervention.  That fact, coupled with the 
observation that the effects of any criminal justice intervention, are likely to 
fade over time, means that data about former offenders’ behavior in the years 
that immediately follow sanction are not only the easiest data to obtain but 
are also likely to be the most relevant for determining whether system 
interventions are having a widespread effect on recidivism rates. 
 
 89 Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327 (2009). 
 90 Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Paying a Price, Long After the Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A23. 
 91 A recent, rare nine-year follow-up study by Mariel Alper, Matthew R. Durose, and 
Joshua Markman of the Bureau of Justice Statistics provides a refreshing counter-example to 
the overall tendency of state and government agencies to focus only on the time immediately 
following release. See Alper et al., supra note 88, at 4. Importantly, the BJS study concludes 
that recidivism rates, while reduced over time, persisted at higher levels than a three-year 
snapshot would suggest. Id. 
 92 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 89, at 331 (“Studies on recidivism consistently 
demonstrate that those who have offended in the past will have the highest probability of 
reoffending within several years, and the probability will decline steadily afterward.”); 
MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM PATTERNS OF PRISONERS 
RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 1 (2014) (“More than a third 
(36.8%) of all prisoners who were arrested within 5 years of release were arrested within the 
first 6 months after release, with more than half (56.7%) arrested by the end of the first year.”). 
 93 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 89, at 331. 
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B. REPORTING RECIDIVISM  
Despite wide variations in how recidivism is defined and measured, it 
remains a key metric used by criminal justice stakeholders to gauge the 
effectiveness of criminal justice interventions.  The following section 
examines how recidivism data are reported and what those reports mean. 
Typically, recidivism studies compare the performance of a defined 
cohort to that of a baseline population over an equal period of time.94  For 
example, a study of participants in a prison education program might report 
how program graduates fared during the three years following their release 
from custody, as compared to a similar cohort of released prisoners who did 
not participate in the educational program.95  Once variables other than the 
intervention are controlled for, the difference between the performance of the 
two groups is then attributed to the intervention itself.96 
The results of recidivism studies are often used to determine whether 
specific criminal justice interventions “reduce recidivism.”  What that means 
is not necessarily self-evident.  When a program is found to reduce recidivism 
by, 10%, that does not mean that each individual who completes the program 
will, on average, go on to commit 10% less crime than the person otherwise 
would have committed.  Instead, it means that an aggregate group of people 
who complete the program will have 10% fewer members of their cohort 
recidivate than a comparable group of people who did not complete the 
program.  This is an important distinction for several reasons. 
First, it reminds us that no retrospective study, or even any predictive 
tool, can tell us what any individual person will do in the future.  It is 
impossible to know from a person’s characteristics and past behavior whether 
the person’s most recent conviction will be the last or whether the person will 
go on to commit serious violations.97  The very best risk prediction 
instruments currently available can tell us which factors, on average, drive 
recidivism, and what people with histories and characteristics similar to a 
particular offender are statistically likely to do in the future.98  However, 
given the variation of human behavior,99 no instrument can reliably predict 
 
 94 See, e.g., Ryang Hui Kim & David Clark, The Effect of Prison-Based College Education 
Programs on Recidivism: Propensity Score Matching Approach, 41 J. CRIM. JUST. 196, 196–
97 (2013). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 198–203. 
 97 See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 89, at 332–33. 
 98 See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014). 
 99 There has been a resurgence in determinism among some neuroscientists and 
punishment theorists. See, e.g., Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. 
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whether any particular person will go on to re-offend or what specific form 
any future re-offense will take.100 
This observation has particular salience for the proper use of 
increasingly popular recidivism risk prediction instruments, presently used 
 
REV. 1403, 1406 (2011) (“[T]here are good moral reasons to conclude that the scientific 
plausibility of determinism ought to lead us to abandon the notion of free will.”); Joshua 
Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1781 (2004) (arguing 
that many of the traditional focuses of criminal law “will lose their grip in an age when the 
mechanical nature of human decision-making is fully appreciated”). Nevertheless, the 
criminal justice system (and the public at large) continues to embrace the traditional view that 
variations in human behavior are best explained by free will and human agency—a factor life 
course criminologists have found to be a meaningful component of desistance from crime. 
See, e.g., Ros Burnett, To Reoffend or Not To Reoffend? The Ambivalence of Convicted 
Property Offenders, in AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER 
REINTEGRATION 174 (Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004) (stating research shows 
“an important characteristic of desistance narratives [is] the theme of being in control . . . an 
ex-offender may need to experience some level of personal success in the straight world before 
they realise that they do not need to offend to regain a sense of personal agency”) (internal 
citations omitted); Laub & Sampson, supra, note 16, at 55 (“[G]iven the role of human agency 
in the desistance process, we need to find a way to measure individual motivation, free will, 
and ultimately the decision to initiate and embrace the process of change.”). 
 100 See Starr, supra note 98, at 806 (explaining that instruments designed to predict 
recidivism employ “underlying regression models [that] may provide reasonably precise 
estimates of the average recidivism rates for the group of offenders sharing the defendant’s 
characteristics, but the uncertainty about what an individual offender will do is much greater, 
and when it comes to predicting individual behavior, the models offer fairly modest 
improvements over chance”). Attempts have been made to develop instruments that can 
differentiate between a person’s risk of committing any offense versus his risk of committing 
a violent offense. Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual 
Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 24–25 (2015). In the main, actuarial tools 
are poor at predicting future violence, in large part because (happily) violent behavior is 
statistically aberrant. Id. at 20 (“violent and sexual recidivism are, contrary to popular belief, 
low rate events, except in extraordinarily high risk populations”); see also Henriette Haas & 
Maurice Cusson, Comparing Theories’ Performance in Predicting Violence, 38 INT’L J. L. & 
PSYCH. 75, 82 (2015) (“Each single theory that we operationalized was quite good at 
predicting non-violence (95.0% to 99%), but none of them could recognize more than thirty 
percent of the violent cases. The interdisciplinary model however did raise the prediction of 
true hits considerably to 36% compared to the theory driven models.”); Daryl G. Kroner et al., 
A Coffee Can, Factor Analysis, and Prediction of Antisocial Behavior: The Structure of 
Criminal Risk, 28 INT’L J. L. & PSYCH. 360 (2005) (testing violent prediction abilities of the 
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), General Statistical Information on Recidivism 
(GSIR), Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), and Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
(PCL-R) against several random, non-structured measures of criminal risk (the “coffee can” 
measures) and finding no statistical difference in the accuracy of their predictions of 
recidivism). 
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at bail hearings,101 sentencing hearings,102 and in correctional decision-
making.103  Despite the de-personalized nature of risk predictions, reports of 
predicted future risk can affect defendants’ access to bond, the nature and 
length of a sentence, and the level of supervision and number of conditions 
to which those serving community-based sentences will be subjected.104 
Second, the aggregate nature of the data contained in recidivism studies 
means that it is impossible to predict from recidivism rates alone which 
specific people will benefit from any particular intervention.  For example, if 
a program claims to reduce recidivism by 25%, policymakers cannot assume 
that all program graduates will leave the program 25% less likely to re-
offend.  Rather, if the baseline re-offense rate for those who do not participate 
in the program is 50%, then policymakers can predict that 37.5% of those 
who do complete the program will go on to recidivate while the remainder 
will not.105  From recidivism data alone, however, they cannot predict who 
the recidivists will be or what characteristics they may share in common. 
Finally, properly interpreting recidivism study outcomes is important 
because it helps explain why those within the criminal justice system often 
consider interventions successful even when they achieve very small 
reductions in recidivism.  To a layperson, it seems strange to say that a 
program can be “successful” if it reduces a cohort’s (often high) risk of future 
offending by a mere 10% or 15%.  However, for many criminal justice 
programs, a reduction of even 10% in baseline offending is considered a 
 
 101 See Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1484–
85 (2017) (discussing bail risk prediction instruments, including the Arnold Foundation’s 
Public Safety Assessment (PSA)). 
 102 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 673 (2015) 
(“More and more, courts today are adopting the use of risk-assessment tools in sentencing.”). 
 103 See J. C. Oleson et al., Training to See Risk: Measuring the Accuracy of Clinical and 
Actuarial Risk Assessments Among Federal Probation Officers, 75 FED. PROB. 52, 53 (2011); 
Amy Robinson-Oost, Evaluation As the Proper Function of the Parole Board: An Analysis of 
New York State’s Proposed Safe Parole Act, 16 CUNY L. REV. 129, 136 (2012) (discussing 
the use of risk instruments at parole release). 
 104 An entire body of literature has begun to address the philosophical, legal, and 
sociological implications of relying on actuarial risk prediction instruments at stages 
throughout the criminal justice process. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST 
PREDICTION (2007); Eaglin, supra note 74; Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: 
Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 232 (2015); Cecelia 
Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence Based Corrections, 91 N.D. L. REV. 537 
(2015); Starr, supra, note 98. 
 105 Cf. Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299, 
338 (2013) (describing various ways of reporting and computing recidivism reduction rates, 
including as percentages). 
2019] MEASURING CHANGE 793 
respectable result.106  The modest recidivism reduction demonstrated by 
many popular correctional interventions is one of the reasons why a sizeable 
number of policymakers and correctional administrators view penal 
rehabilitation with skepticism.107  With treatment outcomes that reduce 
recidivism by such modest percentages, it is not hard to see why the claim 
that “nothing works” to reform repeat offenders has been a recurring mantra 
since Robert Martinson’s now-infamous article was first published.108 
When one looks harder at what is being measured, however, low-impact 
rates are not surprising.  A multitude of complex factors drive criminal 
activity109 and influence behavioral change.110  No single criminal justice 
program significantly eliminates criminal behavior in any sizable percentage 
of participants.111  Such programs may reduce harm by reducing offense rates 
and offense severity among participants and by improving participants’ lives 
on any number of different measures.112  But recidivism data provide only 
 
 106 See Jeffrey A. Butts & John Roman, Better Research for Better Policies, in JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 513 (Francine Sherman & Francine 
Jacobs eds., 2011). Larger effects sizes are sometimes claimed, often in the context of 
assessments conducted by program administrators themselves. Such studies have “indicate[d] 
that demonstration projects, managed by an involved evaluator or program designer, produce 
larger treatment effects than the same programs implemented in a ‘real world’ setting.” 
Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of Thinking for a Change, 
36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 137, 139 (2009). 
 107 Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and 
Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 L. SOC’S REV. 33, 33–35, 37–40 (2011); see also 
Christopher Ingraham, Even Violent Crime Victims Say our Prisons are Making Crime Worse, 
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2016/08/05/even-violent-crime-victims-say-our-prisons-are-making-crime-worse/?utm_term
=.1e639db07ff0 [https://perma.cc/RW77-UN5N]. 
 108 Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 
PUB. INT. 22 (1974). 
 109 Studies have suggested that multiple factors predict re-engagement in criminal 
behavior, including antisocial attitudes and friends, relationship conflicts, substance abuse, 
past criminal behavior, low educational and vocational attainment, marital status, poverty, age 
and gender (young men are the most prolific offenders), challenges in family of origin, 
including familial criminality and exposure to abuse or neglect, cognitive deficiencies, and 
stress. Mandeep K. Dhami et. al., Prisoners’ Positive Illusions of Their Post-Release Success, 
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 631, 633 (2006) (citing Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-analysis of the 
Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1996)). 
 110 See infra Section III.A. 
 111 Weisberg, supra note 30, at 795. 
 112 Programs can succeed in assisting people even when they fail to reduce or eliminate 
criminal behavior. Helping participants conquer addictions, obtain an education, treat unmet 
mental health needs, and improve job and parenting skills are all programmatic results that 
may be achieved with or without a commensurate reduction in recidivism. It is important to 
notice that neither recidivism rates nor the “markers of desistance” I advocate measuring in 
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one measure of success: whether people who complete a program go on to 
commit any offense within the follow-up window.  Recidivism data, as 
typically reported, omit a host of important contextual information, including 
whether the individuals being followed were first-time or chronic 
offenders;113 whether the new offenses were minor or serious; or whether 
program participants changed their rates of offending after having completed 
the program.  In short, pure recidivism data do not provide us with any sense 
of whether a program or other intervention reduces harm but rather how often 
it produces perfection.  Not surprisingly, for many offenders, perfect 
outcomes are difficult to achieve. 
III. BEHAVIORAL CHANGE AND DESISTANCE FROM CRIME 
The preceding sections have discussed the challenge of measuring 
recidivism in a way that provides policymakers with a clear and accurate 
picture of how criminal justice interventions affect subsequent behavior.  
These challenges include detecting recidivism over time and discerning 
which portions of recidivism data are related to the behavior of former 
offenders and which are better attributed to the behavior of system actors.  
Theoretically, with adequate resources and effort, many of these 
methodological challenges could be overcome—or at least mitigated.  But 
even if policymakers are able to bring greater standardization to the 
measurement of recidivism, larger problems remain. 
A. UNDERSTANDING CHANGE 
Although policymakers rarely articulate the assumptions that support 
using recidivism as the primary measure of success, doing so has value, if 
only to focus attention on how implausible many of those assumptions are.  
Recidivism, as it is currently framed, is a binary metric: either a person 
engages in behavior indicative of new criminal activity within the window of 
time the person’s post-intervention behavior is being measured or the person 
does not.  If the person does, he or she is labeled a recidivist and is considered 
a failure.  If the person does not commit a new crime, then he or she is 
successful.  On a larger scale, the same evaluation applies to criminal justice 
programs: if the programs reduce aggregate recidivism, they succeed.  If they 
do not, they have failed. 
 
this Article capture the full range of positive ways in which the criminal justice system may 
affect the lives of the people with whom it intervenes. 
 113 Richard Rosenfeld, Recidivism and its Discontents, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 311, 
314 (2008) (noting “[t]he distinction between correctional veterans and first-timers has all but 
disappeared in contemporary recidivism research”). 
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To probe the plausibility of this approach for measuring success, it is 
helpful to review what is known about the dynamics of human behavioral 
change, of which the cessation of crime is but one variation.  The commission 
of crime is, after all, a subset of the much larger category of antisocial 
behavior, which is combatted in various contexts not only by police and 
correctional personnel but also by parents, teachers, doctors, industrial 
engineers, and employers.114  The study and practice of motivating prosocial 
behavioral change is a common human enterprise, and consequently, a wide 
variety of fields offer examples of alternative ways in which change can be 
documented and quantified. 
Through education and conditioning, humans are socialized from 
infancy to behave in ways that are culturally acceptable within their milieu.115  
The process of acculturation is ongoing, and as environments and 
expectations change throughout the life course, behaviors that were adaptive 
in one environment or acceptable in one life stage must be discarded and new 
 
 114 See, e.g., MEME HIENEMAN ET AL., PARENTING WITH POSITIVE BEHAVIOR SUPPORT: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO RESOLVING YOUR CHILD’S DIFFICULT BEHAVIOR (2006) (providing 
parenting tips for effectively re-directing problematic childhood behavior); MARILYN PINCUS, 
MANAGING DIFFICULT PEOPLE: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR HANDLING ANY EMPLOYEE (2004) 
(offering management tips for redirecting antisocial workplace behavior); Elizabeth E. Stewart 
& Chester Fox, Encouraging Patients to Change Unhealthy Behaviors with Motivational 
Interviewing, FAM. PRACT. MANAGEMENT 22 (2011), http://www.aafp.org/fpm/2011/0500/
p21.html [https://perma.cc/LPD2-PCJV] (describing cognitive behavioral techniques for 
motivating behavioral change in medical patients); Melissa Stormont & Wendy Reinke, The 
Importance of Precorrective Strategies and Behavior-Specific Praise and Strategies to 
Increase Their Use, 18 BEYOND BEHAV. 26, 26 (2009) (observing that since “many young 
children demonstrate behavior that teachers find challenging,” it is incumbent on educators to 
“support children’s social development and use effective practices so that children will be less 
likely to develop or sustain behavioral problems”); Edward C. Tomlinson & Jerald Greenberg, 
Discouraging Employee Theft by Managing Social Norms and Promoting Organizational 
Justice, in MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL DEVIANCE 211 (Roland E. Kidwell & Christopher L. 
Martin, eds. 2012) (describing industrial engineering interventions for preventing employee 
crime). 
 115 Evidence suggests that the intellectual and psychological functions that control 
learning are present from birth and do not change tremendously across the lifespan. See, e.g., 
Lewis P. Lipsitt, Learning Processes of Human Newborns, 12 MERILL-PALMER QUART. 
BEHAV. & DEV. 45, 64 (1966) (presenting evidence of learning in early infancy and pointing 
out that “perhaps not so strangely, the parameters and experimental techniques which seem to 
have most promise at present [in promoting infant learning] are very similar to those known 
for some time to be effective in manipulating animal behavior and adult behavior”). 
Recognition of social norms—and deviation from them—also emerges very early in human 
development. See Marco F. H. Schmidt & Michael Tomasello, Young Children Enforce Social 
Norms, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 232, 234 (2012) (finding that children as young 
as two enforce moral and behavioral norms as part of self-identifying as members of a 
distinctive cultural group). 
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habits acquired.116  Each discipline, from public health to education to 
criminology, has its own paradigm for explaining how behavioral change 
occurs, but all share one feature in common: they see behavior change as a 
process and not as an event. 
In public health, the popular “transtheoretical model” identifies six 
specific stages of change relevant to the abandonment of any maladaptive 
behavior.117  These stages, which follow one another in roughly sequential 
(though sometimes overlapping) order are pre-contemplation, 
contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance, and termination.118  In the 
pre-contemplation stage people deny or ignore the behaviors in need of 
change, with no intention of altering their current behavior.119  In the 
contemplation stage, they wrestle with ambivalence about whether they think 
change is possible or desirable.120  In the preparation stage, they begin to 
muster the skills and the will to break old habits and build new ones, thus 
developing a plan for how they will make needed changes.121  In the action 
stage, they begin to change behavior.122  Importantly, the change that occurs 
in this stage is not always complete.  In the context of smoking cessation, 
action may involve reducing the number of daily cigarettes smoked: for 
weight loss, it may involve calorie reduction.123  The change must be a 
significant alteration from the pre-action behavior, but it need not be 
perfected.  As the new behaviors become more consistent and habitual, and 
the old fade away, people move into the maintenance stage, which may last 
from six months to five years.124  Termination is the final stage, one that may 
be more ideal than real for most people: 
Termination is the stage in which individuals have zero temptation and 100% self-
efficacy. No matter whether they are depressed, anxious, bored, lonely, angry, or 
stressed, they are sure they will not return to their old unhealthy habit as a way of 
coping.125 
 
 116 See generally James E. Thornton, Life-Span Learning: A Developmental Perspective, 
57 INT. J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 55 (2003) (discussing social learning across the lifespan). 
 117 James O. Prochaska & Wayne F. Velicer, The Transtheoretical Model of Health 
Behavior Change, 12 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 38, 38 (1997). 
 118 Id. at 39. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. In its requirement of perfect abstinence from maladaptive behavior, termination 
sounds a lot like recidivism: black and white with no margins of error. 
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As people move through each stage, back-sliding—or relapse—is not 
uncommon.  In fact, “relapse tends to be the rule when action is taken for 
most health behavior problems,” though it often precipitates a fresh effort at 
positive change.126 
The key insight from the transtheoretical model is that “[b]ehavior 
change is a process that unfolds over time through a sequence of stages.”127  
The transtheoretical model has been tested across a wide range of behaviors, 
ranging from addiction to overeating to smoking to delinquency to substance 
abuse.128  Regardless of the behaviors studied, the model appears fairly 
descriptive of the internal and behavioral processes that underlie change.129 
In education, behavior change, in the form of social learning, is typically 
explained as the acquisition and mastery of skills over time.130  In order to 
move from maladaptive behaviors to more mature, prosocial behaviors, 
students must be taught the correct way to be behave.  That is, they must see 
the desired behavior modeled, must be given opportunities to practice the 
skill with corrective and formative feedback, and must have opportunities for 
continued practice in multiple settings, both formal and informal.131  The 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 41. 
 128 See, e.g., Ana Andrés et al., The Transtheoretical Model and Obesity: A Bibliometric 
Study, 73 SCIENTOMETRICS 289 (2007); Fabiana Andrioni De Biaze Vilela et al., The 
Transtheoretical Model and Substance Dependence: Theoretical and Practical Aspects, 31 
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE PSIQUIATRIA, 362 (2009), https://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1516-4446200
9005000010 [https://perma.cc/PWH9-GLBK]; Russell C. Callaghan et al., Does Stage-of-
Change Predict Dropout in a Culturally Diverse Sample of Adolescents Admitted to Inpatient 
Substance-Abuse Treatment? A Test of the Transtheoretical Model, 30 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 
1834 (2005); Christine F. Lerner, The Transtheoretical Model of Change: Self-change in 
Adolescent Delinquent Behaviors, Dissertation Abstracts Int’l, 51(12-B, Pt 1), 6111; James O. 
Prochaska et al., Stages of Change and Decisional Balance for 12 Problem Behaviors, 13 
HEALTH PSYCH. 39 (1994) (summarizing research on change across multiple problem 
behaviors including smoking cessation, quitting cocaine, weight control, high-fat diets, 
adolescent delinquent behaviors, safer sex, condom use, sunscreen use, radon gas exposure, 
exercise acquisition, mammography screening, and physicians’ preventive practices with 
smokers). 
 129 Prochaska, supra note 128, at 39. 
 130 See, e.g., Pedro Gil-Madrona et al., Acquisition and Transfer of Values and Social 
Skills through a Physical Education Program Focused in the Affective Domain, 12 
MORTICIDADE 32 (2016) (reporting on effects of social behavior training on student behavior 
in the context of physical education courses); David J. Hansen et al., Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of Social Skills Interventions with Adolescents, 21 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 
489 (1998); Paulo N. Lopes & Peter Salovey, Toward a Broader Education: Social, 
Emotional, and Practical Skills, in BUILDING ACADEMIC SUCCESS ON SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL 
LEARNING: WHAT DOES THE RESEARCH SAY? (Joseph E. Zins et al., eds. 2004). 
 131 Rosemary Battalio & J. Todd Stephens, Social Skills Training: Teacher Practices and 
Perceptions, 14 BEYOND BEHAV. 15, 15 (2015); see also Michael Bullis et al., A Promise 
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Positive Behavioral Support model, which has gained traction in many 
American public schools as a model for advancing behavioral change,132 
posits that: 
[A]lthough learning and teaching processes are complex and continuous, and some 
behavior initially is not learned (e.g., biobehavioral), key messages from this science 
are that much of human behavior is learned, comes under the control of environmental 
factors, and can be changed. The strength of the science is that problem behaviors 
become more understandable, and, as our understanding grows, so does our ability to 
teach more socially appropriate and functional behavior.133 
In this model, the mechanisms for preventing antisocial behavior and 
the mechanisms for responding to it are the same: prevention and early 
intervention efforts; a “culture that provides multiple opportunities to display 
and receive positive reinforcement for prosocial behavior;” a range of 
strategies and responses that can be calibrated to the specific problem 
behavior and to the needs of the learner; and a reliance on evidence-based 
programs.134 
While much of the literature on behavioral education is focused on 
teaching children and young adult learners, the principles on which they rest 
transfer readily to adult learners.  Prosocial education is by no means limited 
to the formation of children; adult learners can also manifest disruptive 
behaviors that require intervention by educators, ranging from inattention to 
threats of violence.135  Notably, the correctional programs that appear to be 
most effective in reducing recidivism are those that utilize a cognitive-based 
therapy (CBT) approach.136  The “goal of CBT is to help offenders develop 
 
Unfulfilled: Social Skills Training with At-Risk and Antisocial Children and Youth, 9 
EXCEPTIONALITY 67 (2001). 
 132 U.S. DEPT. OF ED., 22D ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, III-10-III-22 (2000). 
 133 Id.; see also Anthony Biglan, Translating What We Know About the Context of 
Antisocial Behavior into a Lower Prevalence of Such Behavior, 28 J. APPLIED BEHAV. 
ANALYSIS 479 (1995). 
 134 Mack D. Burke et al., Preventing School-Based Antisocial Behaviors with School-
Wide Positive Behavioral Support, 1 J. EARLY & INTENSIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTION 65, 66 
(2004). 
 135 See Robert Dobmeier & Joseph Moran, Dealing with Disruptive Behavior of Adult 
Learners, 22 NEW HORIZONS ADULT ED. & HUM. RESOURCE DEV. 29, 39–41 (2008); Gerard 
M. Schippers et al., Social Skills Training, Prosocial Behavior, and Aggressiveness in Adult 
Incarcerated Offenders, 45 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 244, 246 
(2001) (finding positive results in study of Dutch prison program that teaches social skills 
through “techniques as modeling, feedback, role playing, imitation, coaching, and social 
reinforcement”). 
 136 See Cullen et al., supra note 60, at 50; Nana A. Landenberger & Mark W. Lipsey, The 
Positive Effects of Cognitive–Behavioral Programs for Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Factors 
Associated with Effective Treatment, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 451, 472 (2005). 
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a new way of thinking by providing them with a chance to model, role-play, 
and practice pro-social skills.”137  That model, which employs the same tools 
advocated by educators, has repeatedly outperformed other models of 
correctional intervention in terms of its effect on recidivism rates.138  That 
fact bolsters the key insight educators offer: the mastery of skills occurs over 
time and comes only with repeated practice.139 
The subfields of sociology known as developmental and life course 
criminology embrace paradigms of behavioral change that complement those 
used by educators and public health providers in many ways.  Through 
longitudinal studies of the kind discussed above, criminologists have 
examined the ways in which antisocial behavior, both criminal and non-
criminal, manifests at different life stages. 140  In doing so, they have focused 
on identifying the factors that correlate not only with commencement of 
crime but with its termination.  The term used most often to describe this 
disentanglement from criminal behavior is desistance.141 
While desistance is sometimes used as a synonym for termination of 
offending, it is not a singular event.142  Rather, as Sampson and Laub explain 
in their seminal work on the subject, desistance “is a social transition that 
entails identity transformation, as from a smoker to a nonsmoker, from a 
married or coupled person to a divorced or uncoupled person, or from an 
offender to a nonoffender.”143  In other words, “just like quitting smoking or 
uncoupling, desistance is best viewed as a process rather than a discrete 
event.”144 
Across an individual’s lifespan, engagement with crime varies 
according to a wide number of variables, the most powerful being age.145  In 
youth, crime is so statistically prevalent that it is considered sociologically 
 
 137 JASLENE LIZAMA ET AL., CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y, WHAT WORKS? SHORT-TERM IN-
CUSTODY TREATMENT PROGRAMS 7 (2014), http://cpp.fullerton.edu/pdf/What%20Works.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4G8V-8U9N]. 
 138 See Brandon A. Gaudiano, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies: Achievements and 
Challenges, 11 EVIDENCE BASED MENTAL HEALTH 5, 5–7 (2008). 
 139 See Susan H. Spence, Social Skills Training with Children and Young People: Theory, 
Evidence and Practice, 8 CHILD & ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH 84, 90 (2003) (“The practice 
of target responses is essential for skill acquisition and improvement.”). 
 140 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 141 Laub & Sampson, supra note 16, at 11. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 12. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship: Social 
Variation, Social Explanations, in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY 
378 (K. Beaver, B. Boutwell, and J.C. Barnes eds., 2014) (“It is a truism that age is one of the 
strongest factors associated with criminal behavior.”). 
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normative,146 particularly among males—a fact that explains why most 
crimes are committed by men between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five.147  
With age usually (and gradually) comes wisdom, lower energy, more peer 
restraints, and, typically, desistance from crime.148  Although the pathways 
into and out of criminal behavior vary from person to person, there are some 
factors that repeatedly have been found to affect desistance: 
[D]esistance stems from a variety of complex processes—developmental, 
psychological, and sociological—and thus there are several factors associated with it. 
The key elements seem to be aging; a good marriage; securing legal, stable work; and 
deciding to “go straight,” including a reorientation of the costs and benefits of crime. 
Processes of desistance from crime in general, specific types of crime, and multiple 
forms of problem behavior seem to be quite similar.149 
What is it about these elements that promotes desistance? Most scholars 
conclude that it is not the events per se, but rather the moral and emotional 
“turning points” they provide that create opportunities for people to redefine 
their identities and accordingly reshape their behavior.150  No single turning 
point can be guaranteed to change behavior, but each offers an opportunity 
for re-orientation.  In this model, criminal sanctions, educational attainments, 
drug treatment, or a new relationship all serve a similar function with respect 
to behavioral change: they provide a new chapter in a person’s life narrative 
that may reinforce a negative self-identity or offer a chance to change one’s 
 
 146 Christopher Uggen & Michael Massoglia, Desistance from Crime and Deviance as a 
Turning Point in the Life Course, in HANDBOOK OF THE LIFE COURSE 312 (Jeylan T. Mortimer 
& Michael J. Shanahan eds., 2002) (“[A] long line of self-report research has demonstrated 
that almost every adolescent admits to some form of delinquency.”); Ulmer & Steffensmeier, 
supra, note 145, at 378 (“[A] significant portion of U.S. national crime rate trends over time 
can be explained by fluctuations in the proportion of the population in the crime-prone age 
group of fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds.). 
 147 Ulmer & Steffensmeier, supra note 145, at 377–78. 
 148 See MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 124–
26 (1990); ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND 
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 6 (1993); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the 
Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (1983). 
 149 Laub & Sampson, supra note 16, at 3. 
 150 Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A Life-Course Theory of Cumulative 
Disadvantage and the Stability of Delinquency, in DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES OF CRIME AND 
DELINQ. 1133, 1143 (Terence P. Thornberry ed., 1997) (quoting MICHAEL RUTTER & 
MARJORIE RUTTER, DEVELOPING MINDS: CHALLENGE AND CONTINUITY ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 
244 (1993) (“In our theoretical model, turning points may be positive or negative because they 
represent ‘times of decision or opportunity when life trajectories may be directed on to more 
adaptive or maladaptive paths.’”). 
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story.151  Although there are documented cases in which a singular, salient 
event precipitated the decision to “go straight,” a more common story is that 
multiple opportunities for change combine, leading to a gradual 
diminishment in criminal behavior.  Whether this is understood as a change 
in identity,152 a change in social role,153 or a re-interpretation of a life 
narrative,154 the result is the same: through a process of reflection and 
socialization, a person disentangles herself from crime. 
B. MEASURING PROGRESS 
If change is a process rather than an event, using a binary metric like 
recidivism is too one-dimensional.  While recidivism data tell us whether 
those exposed to various interventions re-offended during the follow-up 
window, they tell us nothing about the nature of the re-offense or whether the 
trajectory of a person’s subsequent contacts with the law suggest a move 
toward desistance or away from it.  But what alternatives exist? Not 
surprisingly, answers can be found by again considering how fields related 
to criminal justice respond to the challenge of measuring change over time. 
Education is a good place to start.  Like criminal justice, American 
primary education is a local enterprise with significant variation among states 
in the contents and methods of teaching.155  Also like criminal justice, 
education involves the outlay of significant public funds: in 2013–2014, 
states and the federal government spent $634 billion on K–12 education.156  
With that investment comes a demand for public accountability. 
In recent years, there have been numerous attempts at the federal and 
state levels to standardize curricula and require the generation and analysis 
of metrics, such as standardized test scores, to hold teachers accountable for 
 
 151 See generally SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND 
REBUILD THEIR LIVES (2001) (discussing differences in the autobiographical narratives of 
“persisters” and “desisters”); Uggen & Massoglia, supra note 146, at 311. 
 152 Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Desistance and the “Feared Self”: Toward an 
Identity Theory of Criminal Desistance, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1103, 1105 (2009). 
 153 See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS 
AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993); David Best, Social Identity, Social Networks and 
Social Capital in Desistance and Recovery, in MOVING ON FROM CRIME AND SUBSTANCE USE: 
TRANSFORMING IDENTITIES (Anne Robinson & Paula Hamilton eds., 2016). 
 154 MARUNA, supra note 151. 
 155 See Ralph D. Mawdsley & Paul Williams, Teacher Assessment and Credentialing: The 
Role of the Federal Government in a State Function, 262 ED. L. REP. 735, 736 (2011) 
(discussing federal legislation responding to “a lack of consistency among the states”). 
 156 U.S. DEPT. ED., NAT’L CTR. ED. STAT., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION (2017). 
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student learning.157  Standardized tests, which students across the country are 
required to take at periodic intervals,158 are the educational analogs to 
recidivism rates.  They measure educational achievement in tested subject 
matter and nothing more.  When high percentages of students make adequate 
yearly progress on grade level expectations, state and local education systems 
are often lauded as successes, and when large numbers fail to make such 
progress, schools and teachers are labeled as “failing.”159 
A difference between education and criminal justice is that while 
criminal justice administrators have largely accepted recidivism as a valid 
metric of their own success, educators and educational administrators have 
heavily resisted such simplistic measures of achievement.160  Recognizing 
the wide variety of factors that affect student learning—many of which lie 
outside educators’ control—teachers across the country have fought efforts 
to define educational success by reference only to test scores.161  Through 
unions lobbying, media campaigns, and grassroots coalition building, 
educators have fought against what they assert has been an over-emphasis on 
tests scores alone as a metric of student and teacher achievement.162 
In response, some districts have introduced “value-added” assessments 
to better capture the role of teachers in student growth over time.  The goal 
 
 157 See, e.g., Jessica E. Ozalp & Rachel E. Snyder, School Accountability After “No Child 
Left Behind,” 89 WIS. LAW 28, 28 (July/Aug. 2016) (explaining that both the Every Student 
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a.cc/TV8B-HNNA]; Kathleen Megan, State Eliminates Test Scores From Teacher 
Evaluations, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.courant.com/education/hc-stat
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Assessment Policies, 2012 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 5–15 (2012). 
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of these tools is to control for “exogenous factors” such as poverty, friends, 
and familial stability, “focus[ing] on achievement gains over time for the 
same individual or groups of students.”163  Although such assessments 
theoretically offer a more nuanced way of measuring student growth—and 
the role of teachers in fostering it—they too have been met with pushback 
from educators.164  Their objections are grounded in part on the difficulty of 
“isolat[ing] one specific teacher’s contribution to students’ learning, leading 
to situations where a teacher might be identified as a bad teacher simply 
because her colleagues are ineffective.”165 
Educators have argued instead that because “learning is a complex 
process,” assessments of learning 
should . . . emplo[y] a diverse array of methods, including those that call for actual 
performance, using them over time so as to reveal change, growth, and increasing 
degrees of integration. Such an approach aims for a more complete and accurate picture 
of learning, and therefore firmer bases for improving . . . students’ educational 
experience.166 
In other words, without rejecting the role that data can play in assessing 
the success of the educational enterprise, teachers and school administrators 
have required that data be used to trace the learning process itself, looking 
for multiple forms of evidence of growth over time rather than simple 
snapshots of isolated performance. 
Of course, there are key differences between education and corrections.  
Failure to learn can reduce the quality of students’ lives, but it does not 
imperil the lives of others.  Crime sometimes does endanger others, and it 
nearly always reduces the quality of life for those affected by it.  In light of 
that difference, it might seem fair to hold the criminal justice system to a 
higher standard.  The problem is that overreliance on recidivism provides 
only one-dimensional data that masks important information about the 
degree to which criminal justice interventions are, in the words of educational 
assessment, “adding value”—or reducing it.  Examining more nuanced data 
about individual and aggregate behavioral change over time could yield 
much more revealing information about not just whether, but in what ways 
 
 163 Ryan, supra note 159, at 981. 
 164 See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, Principals Reject ‘Value-Added’ Assessment that Links Test 
Scores to Educators’ Jobs, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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of isolating the effects of any given prison program from other confounding factors that might 
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 166 ALEXANDER ASTIN ET. AL., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HIGHER LEARNING: FORUM, 
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804 KLINGELE [Vol. 109 
people recidivate and the degree to which criminal justice programs move 
them away from criminal behavior or propel them toward it. 
So, what relevance does the experience of educators have for attempts 
to measure success in the criminal justice system? First, like educators, 
criminal justice system actors should demand an acknowledgement by 
policymakers and the public that recidivism is affected by a host of 
interacting, exogenous factors, many of which the criminal justice system 
can do little to affect.  Second, like educators, criminal justice system actors 
should resist efforts to oversimplify the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
interventions by reference to a measure as insensitive as pure recidivism 
rates. 
But what is the alternative to relying on recidivism? The answer to that 
question can be found in the way criminologists measure change over time.  
Although criminologists gather data on recidivism, they do not examine it in 
isolation.  Rather, in identifying “what works” to promote desistance, 
criminologists look not at isolated recidivism rates but rather at how those 
rates of offense change over time for individual offenders and among readily-
identifiable subgroups of offenders (“youth” or “burglars” for example) as 
well as how those changes connect to other key contextual events.167  The 
richest studies meld qualitative and quantitative data to create a three-
dimensional view of the effects of various life events and interventions. 
Those in the criminal justice system do not typically have the resources 
to extend follow-up windows or conduct surveys or interviews.  That does 
not mean, however, that they must settle for pure recidivism rates.  In recent 
years, policy-engaged criminologists have suggested that criminal justice 
administrators should look beyond recidivism rates to identify the patterns of 
behavior those rates can reveal over time.  In a notable policy brief, Ryan 
King and Brian Elderbroom of the Urban Institute urged state program 
administrators to think more broadly about measuring programmatic 
success.168  They explained, “Though failure rates should serve as the 
foundation of recidivism research, it is critical to move beyond them to 
improving recidivism as a performance measure.”169  Specifically, they urged 
states to include in reports measures such as “time to failure, crime severity, 
and behavior changes as indicators of success.”170  More recently, in a white 
paper arising out of the Harvard Kennedy School Executive Session on 
 
 167 See, e.g., MARUNA, supra note 151. 
 168 RYAN KING & BRIAN ELDERBROOM, IMPROVING RECIDIVISM AS A PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE, URB. INST. 2 (2014), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/UI-ImprovingRecidivism.
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 170 Id. at 3. 
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Community Corrections, Jeffrey Butts and Vincent Schiraldi argued that 
“[j]ustice policy should reduce the importance of recidivism and focus on 
desistance.”171  They suggest that doing so might involve not only the 
analysis of existing data but also the collection of additional information 
about the changing “attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs” of people who have 
been the subject of criminal justice intervention.172 
Replete throughout the desistance literature are references to indicators 
that signal desistance or its absence.173  Some of these, such as attitudes about 
the law, are best captured through qualitative research.  Several, however—
particularly changes in offense severity over time and alterations in the 
frequency of offending—are easily derived from existing recidivism data by 
calculating changes in crime severity over time, and the time between new 
criminal incidents.  Rarely, however, do these markers of desistance make 
their way into reports assessing the effectiveness of any particular criminal 
justice program. 
To illustrate this point, imagine that you are a program analyst who has 
decided to conduct a five-year recidivism study examining re-arrest rates of 
all graduates of a prison-based anger management course.  To assess 
recidivism rates, you will need to collect arrest records for program graduates 
and for members of a control group of prisoners who did not take the class 
but are otherwise similar to those who did.  With just those records, you could 
report not just on recidivism but on a great deal more.  The official record 
that tells you John Doe was re-arrested within five years of release will also 
tell you for what he was arrested and how long after his release the arrest 
occurred.  Moreover, if John Doe is arrested three times more, those arrest 
records, when viewed together and compared against John’s criminal history, 
will tell you whether he is slowing down or speeding up in terms of his 
criminal productivity and whether his behavior is escalating, diminishing, or 
holding steady in terms of severity.  That kind of information, averaged out 
across the larger population of graduates and controls, can also tell you 
whether a study group is, in the main, offending more or less the same or 
differently than they historically have done in addition to how their offending 
 
 171 JEFFREY A. BUTTS & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, RECIDIVISM RECONSIDERED: PRESERVING 
THE COMMUNITY JUSTICE MISSION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, HARVARD KENNEDY 
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patterns compare to those of the control group.  This information would allow 
a picture to emerge of change over time—a picture that is less focused on 
whether former offenders have fully terminated their criminal careers 
(though it could reveal that as well) and more interested in whether they are 
desisting from or persisting in criminal behavior as a result of their 
engagement with a specific intervention.  Although this data would be subject 
to all of the limitations of data on recidivism generally (inconsistent 
definitions, over and under-inclusion of criminal behavior through reliance 
on official court records, etc.)174, it would be far superior to current reliance 
on recidivism rates alone. 
It would be inaccurate to say that the methods described above, so 
commonplace in academic criminological research, are never reflected in 
evaluations by professionals within the criminal justice system.  Periodically, 
system analysts will issue a study or white paper demonstrating the ability to 
use recidivism data to produce more nuanced information (reporting on the 
age of recidivists or classifying the nature of their re-arrest, for example)175, 
but these are the exception and not the rule.  Far too often, recidivism 
continues to be reported—and therefore understood—as a binary event rather 
than as the dynamic process it is.  As the following section explains, that is a 
missed opportunity. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF RECIDIVISM DATA 
In light of the mechanisms of change discussed above, it is clear that 
using markers of desistance to measure and report on the effectiveness of 
criminal justice programs would have significant benefits.  It may be less 
clear, however, how the failure to utilize these more nuanced markers is 
actively harmful to the criminal justice system and those affected by it.  The 
following section discusses three problems that can be created when the 
binary metric of recidivism is used to measure the success of the criminal 
justice system.  These include data gaming, risk-aversive behavior by system 
actors, and the premature termination of otherwise-promising programs for 
advancing public safety. 
 
 174 See supra Section II; infra Section IV. 
 175 See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE EFFECTS OF AGING ON RECIDIVISM AMONG 
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A. DATA GAMING 
Criminal justice programs are under tremendous pressure to produce 
data that demonstrates significant “good” outcomes, and that pressure can—
in ways both conscious and subconscious—affect the validity of the data they 
generate.176  Scandals in education related to the falsification of standardized 
test results are an analogous example;177 making criminal justice system 
actors accountable for reducing recidivism incentivizes gaming the 
underlying data.  Placing a high premium on recidivism rates encourages 
program administrators not to reduce re-offending so much as to reduce 
statistical rates of recidivism.178  As a result, improvements in recidivism 
rates often tell us more about the behavior of system actors than of 
individuals with prior criminal records.  Two examples help illustrate this 
point. 
First, consider recent efforts across the country to reduce failure rates 
for individuals on community supervision.  In states from California to North 
Carolina, large numbers of people have, at times, been re-incarcerated while 
serving sentences of probation or parole.179  Sometimes, the triggering event 
for re-incarceration is the commission of a new crime.180  Other times, 
incarceration is triggered by the violation of non-criminal rule, ranging from 
 
 176 See Mia Bird & Ryken Grattet, Realignment and Recidivism, 664 ANN. AM. ACAD. 
POL’Y & SOC. SCI. 176, 192 (2016) (“[A]n observed change in a particular measure of 
recidivism may reflect a change in offender behavior; it can also be inadvertently affected by 
criminal justice process changes or even intentionally manipulated to produce indications of 
success.”); Anthony Petrosino & Haluk Soydan, The Impact of Program Developers as 
Evaluators on Criminal Recidivism: Results from Meta-Analyses of Experimental and Quasi-
Experimental Research, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 435, 444 (2005) (finding 
“consistent with prior meta-analyses in offender rehabilitation, . . . that studies in which 
evaluators were greatly influential in the design and implementation of treatment report 
consistently and substantially larger effect sizes than other types of evaluators.”). 
 177 Motoko Rich, Scandal in Atlanta Reignites Debate Over Tests’ Role, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
2, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/education/atlanta-cheating-scandal-reignites-
testing-debate.html [https://perma.cc/Q4V3-LLNK]; THOMAS S. DEE ET AL., THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF TEST SCORE MANIPULATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE NEW YORK REGENTS 
EXAMINATIONS, NAT’L BUREAU  ECON. RES. (2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22165.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/76JF-HB5T]. 
 178 Cullen et al., supra note 60, at 51 (“Another challenge is to ensure that correctional 
personnel cannot influence outcome measures.”). 
 179 Klingele, supra note 85, at 1019, 1030–31. 
 180 PEW CTR. ON STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S 
PRISONS 7, 9 (2011). 
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minor infractions to more serious violations.181  As discussed earlier, many 
times these returns to custody are coded as instances of recidivism.182 
Recognizing the political, fiscal, and human costs associated with such 
community supervision “failure,” many states have undertaken efforts to 
reduce their revocation rates.183  They have often done so not by changing 
the behavior of those being supervised but rather by changing the behavior 
of those doing the supervising.  California offers a prime example. Prior to 
the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata,184 California had 
one of the highest parole revocation rates in the nation at more than 66% in 
2005.185  In Plata, the Court held that as a result of ongoing Constitutional 
violations in the conditions of its prisons, California was required to reduce 
its overall prison population by 37,000 people.186  Recognizing the enormity 
of this reduction, the Court offered suggestions for how such a change could 
be safely accomplished, including by diverting “technical parole violators to 
community-based programs.”187 
That is, in fact, exactly what California did (among other things).  
Following Plata, parolee arrest and revocation rates plummeted, falling from 
44.6% in 2011188 to 7% twelve months later.189  What drove this dramatic 
change? Bird & Grattet report: 
There is anecdotal evidence that arrest decisions are shifting from a lesser reliance on 
arrests for supervision violations to a greater reliance on arrests for felonies . . . . These 
shifting patterns will directly impact reported rates of recidivism, and it will be 
 
 181 Klingele, supra note 85, at 1030–31 (“One study followed individuals released from 
prison in 2004 and found that in thirteen states, 25% or more of those released were 
reincarcerated for purely ‘technical’ violations of community supervision within three 
years.”). 
 182 See PEW CTR. ON STATES, supra note 180, at 33–37; discussion supra Section II.A, at 
9. 
 183 See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, REDUCING INCARCERATION FOR TECHNICAL 
VIOLATIONS IN LOUISIANA (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/11/psp
preducingincarcerationfortechnicalviolationsinlouisiana.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PRU-FUY6]. 
 184 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (ordering California prisons to reduce 
overcrowding following years of Constitutional violations brought about by deficient 
conditions). 
 185 Ryken Grattet et al., Parole Violations and Revocations in California: Analysis and 
Suggestions for Action, 73 FED. PROBATION 2, 2 (2009). 
 186 Plata, 563 U.S. at 501. 
 187 Id. 
 188 CAL. DEP’T. OF CORRS. & REHAB., 2015 OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT: AN 
EXAMINATION OF OFFENDERS RELEASED IN FISCAL YEAR 2010–11 1 (2016), https://dev-multi
site.mystagingwebsite.com/research/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2018/04/2015-Outcome-Eva
luation-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/69BV-FU38]. 
 189 Bird & Grattet, supra note 176, at 186 (“In one year’s time, California went from 
having one of the highest return-to-custody rates in the nation to one of the lowest.”). 
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challenging to separate changes in discretionary decision-making from changes in 
underlying offender behavior.190 
A similar phenomenon can be seen in Arizona.  In 2008, 6,800 people 
were revoked from supervision in the state.191  That same year, the state 
legislature passed the Safe Communities Act, which, among other things, 
shortened periods of supervision for people who were in compliance with the 
terms of supervision (thereby reducing the time they were “at hazard” of 
revocation) and “[c]reated incentives for county probation agencies to reduce 
revocations.”192  The effort was met with modest success: while the 
supervision population held steady, the number of annual revocations had 
decreased to 4,800 by 2016.193 
In a short period of time, both California and Arizona saw notable 
reductions in recidivism-defined-as-revocation rates for those on community 
supervision.194  In both cases, however, there is no reason to think that these 
improvements in recidivism-as-revocation rates were driven by changes in 
the behavior of people on supervision.195  Instead, the reductions appear to 
reflect a conscious decision by the agencies overseeing probationers and 
parolees to take a less punitive approach to violations of supervision rules, 
either by choice (Arizona) or legal necessity (California).196  While such 
 
 190 Id. at 193. 
 191 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, REDUCING RECIDIVISM: STATES DELIVER RESULTS 3 
(2017), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/12.15.17_Reducing-Recidiv
ism.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NQ6-APU4]. 
 192 Id. at 4. 
 193 Id. at 3. 
 194 Id. at 4 (showing 29% decline between 2008 and 2016 in Arizona in people admitted 
to prison due to probation violations); Bird & Grattet, supra note 176, 186–87 (describing 
California’s plummeting revocation rate). 
 195 See MIA BIRD ET AL., REALIGNMENT AND RECIDIVISM IN CALIFORNIA, PUB. POL’Y INST. 
OF CAL. 9 (2017) (“[W]hen comparing the reconviction rates of individuals released before 
and after realignment, it is important to consider how realignment changed the likelihood that 
criminal justice systems would pursue formal convictions . . . . Under realignment, most 
offenders can only be sent to prison following conviction on a new, prison-eligible offense—
meaning that correctional systems may be shifting away from revocations and toward more 
formal rearrests and reconvictions. Therefore, if we were to see increases in reconviction rates 
after realignment, we should not necessarily assume these differences were driven by an 
increase in reoffending behavior.”). 
 196 Cf. ARIZONA ADULT PROBATION FY 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, AZ SUP. CT. ADMIN. OFF. 
OF THE CTS. 5-6 (2016), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/25/AnnRepPop/FY2016_%20RE
PORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/55AN-98BW] (quoting the Director of Adult Probation Services: 
“We have moved low risk offenders to a very different level of supervision that requires 
accountability but not the usual resources utilized and required by higher risk offenders to be 
successful. Based on the research, our focus is now on the higher risk individuals which are 
the offenders with the higher priority on the caseloads for supervision . . . . [W]e continue to 
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outcomes may reflect wise public policy decisions, they do not suggest that 
those on supervision desisted.  Instead, they suggest that system actors 
changed their response.  These examples illustrate the ways in which 
recidivism data can be altered in ways that reflect external, political factors 
as much individual, behavioral ones. 
Probation supervision is not the only place where overreliance on 
recidivism rates can alter the behavior of system actors in unintended ways.  
Specialty courts, such as drug courts, provide another example of how the 
behavior of system actors—rather than offenders—sometimes changes in 
order to improve reported recidivism rates for program participants. Drug 
courts are popular specialty programs that developed out of concern about 
the over-criminalization of addiction.197  Drug courts offer a more 
collaborative model of decision-making, with a judge and lawyers as 
members of a larger “treatment team.”198  Participants are given access to 
drug treatment and other needed resources in lieu of traditional adversarial 
adjudication.199  Graduates typically see their original charges dismissed or 
reduced, while those terminated for non-compliance are sentenced 
traditionally.200  Program success (and in turn, continued funding) is 
ordinarily determined by the recidivism rates of program graduates as 
compared to traditionally-prosecuted defendants.201 
 
focus on supervising, engaging, coaching and supporting successful completions of probation 
as we have since the adoption of Evidence Based Practice.”). 
 197 See Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-
First Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 717, 725 (2008); see also Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/
courts/drug-courts/Pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZC9K-3N74]. 
 198 See Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of 
Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1492 (2004). 
 199 Estimates suggest that in 2012, there were more than 1,300 drug courts operating in 
the United States. SUZANNE M. STRONG ET AL., CENSUS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS, 2012, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 3 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpsc12.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/6VYC-S6DA]. The popularity of treatment courts expands to other social problems as 
well, including mental illness, domestic violence, veterans’ issues, and drunken driving: 
estimates suggest there are currently over 1,700 problem-solving courts addressing issues 
other than drug use. Id. Most of these, like drug courts, are required by their funding agencies 
to track recidivism among program graduates. 
 200 Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 788 (2008). 
 201 In New Mexico, for example, the Legislative Finance Committee’s Program 
Evaluation Unit presented findings to the state legislature on the performance of drug courts 
statewide, making recommendations for certification that include “performance measures 
such as graduation, recidivism, and costs . . . to ensure courts are meeting meaningful 
performance targets.” N.M. LEG. FIN. COMM., PROGRAM EVALUATION: UPDATE ON NEW 
MEXICO DRUG COURTS, 53rd Sess., at 26 (2017). Similarly, funding for adult drug courts from 
the U.S. Department of Justice requires grant applicants to “[b]riefly describe the data 
collection mechanism that the applicant will use to collect and report in-program progress as 
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Placing such significance on graduates’ recidivism rates creates two 
well-documented problems in data generation.  First, drug courts are 
incentivized to limit entry to individuals with the highest prospect of 
successfully completing the program and going on to avoid re-offense.  In 
many cases, this means that drug courts limit participation to first-time, non-
violent offenders with no co-occurring conditions202—the very people who 
are least likely to need any intervention at all.  For many of these individuals, 
the program is likely to make no difference; they were already unlikely to 
commit new crimes. 
In addition to limiting entry to low-risk candidates, over emphasis on 
recidivism rates also pressures drug courts to quickly terminate from the 
program any participants who are having difficulty remaining sober—a 
difficulty those with serious substance abuse problems would be expected to 
have.  Because these addicts are predictably less likely than their less-
addicted counterparts to avoid future reconviction, drug court administrators 
have an incentive to exclude them from the cohort of graduates whose 
performance will drive future funding of the program.203  This disincentive 
to continue working with more serious drug offenders undercuts the very 
purpose for which drug courts exist (i.e., to assist people in overcoming 
addiction and related criminal behavior). It also leads to harsher punishment 
for serious addicts.  Research has consistently found that individuals 
sentenced after being terminated from drug court programs face punishment 
many times harsher than traditionally-sentenced drug offenders.204 
 
well as post-program recidivism information.” BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, Adult Drug 
Court Discretionary Grant Program FY 2018 Competitive Grant Announcement, 20 (2018) 
https://www.bja.gov/funding/DrugCourts18.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRA4-9LVD]. 
 202 AVINASH SINGH BHATI ET AL., URB. INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR., TO TREAT OR NOT TO 
TREAT: EVIDENCE ON THE PROSPECTS OF EXPANDING TREATMENT TO DRUG-INVOLVED 
OFFENDERS 7–8 (2008), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/31621/411645-
To-Treat-or-Not-to-Treat.PDF [https://perma.cc/4X8Z-8EBY]. 
 203 Cf. John A. Bozza, Benevolent Behavior Modification: Understanding the Nature and 
Limitations of Problem-Solving Courts, 17 WIDENER L. J. 97, 118–19 (2007) (“Drug courts, 
and probably mental health courts, are by definition dealing with a special population of 
offenders. They are selective. Certain offenders, because of bad criminal histories or because 
they have committed certain crimes, cannot participate. Moreover, of those who are eligible, 
only those amenable to treatment are chosen and they are not necessarily individuals who are 
addicted to drugs.”). 
 204 See Bowers, supra note 200. It is also true, however, that due to the length of drug 
court interventions, even “defendants who progress through the entire treatment court regime 
and who upon ‘graduation’ have their charges dismissed ultimately may have received ‘a more 
onerous disposition in terms of the length of time [they are] subject to court control than they 
would have received if the charges had been resolved through standard plea negotiations or 
trial.” Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Court Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1205, 1256 (1998). 
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Overreliance on recidivism rates as a success metric encourages drug 
court programs to reject the very people who are most likely to benefit from 
the extra resources the drug court offers.  The irony is acute because 
substance abuse treatment providers have long embraced the mantra that 
“relapse is a part of recovery” and that the road to sobriety almost always 
includes set-backs205—many of which would qualify as “recidivism” if 
detected and punished. 
The pressure to create good outcome statistics by limiting access to 
programs is not limited to the drug court context.  All criminal justice 
programs that are assessed based on their reported reductions in recidivism 
rates find themselves in a similar bind: admit those who most need help and 
who are therefore at highest risk of recidivating, or admit those with lower 
risks and needs who will be less likely to recidivate.  When funding turns on 
recidivism reductions, the pressure to game the data is particularly acute.206  
If you admit those in most need of help, you increase your reported failure 
rates; if you admit those who do not need your help, your programs success 
rates skyrocket.  Discussing this problem in the context of juvenile justice, 
one foundation director explained; “One way to have low recidivism rates is 
to sweep up kids who are low risk and formally handle them in the 
system . . . .If the system concentrates only on very high-risk kids you’ll 
probably have higher recidivism rates.”207 
How would these outcomes be different if desistance were the measure 
of success rather than recidivism? While there are opportunities for data 
gaming in any system, the incentives to game decrease as emphasis shifts 
away from demonstrating perfect outcomes and toward demonstrating 
realistic, measurable progress.  If programs were deemed successful when 
 
 205 See, e.g., Lisa Lightman & Francine Byrne, Addressing the Co-occurrence of Domestic 
Violence and Substance Abuse: Lessons from Problem-Solving Courts, 6 J. CTR FOR FAM., 
CHILD. & CTS. 53, 65 (2005) (“Relapse . . . is generally considered a common element in the 
process of recovery from substance abuse.”); see also David Sack, Why Relapse Isn’t a Sign 
of Failure, PSYCH. TODAY (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/where-sci
ence-meets-the-steps/201210/why-relapse-isnt-sign-failure [https://perma.cc/7JCR-FXFN]. 
 206 See, e.g., CTR. FOR STATE GOV’TS, REDUCING RECIDIVISM 12 (2014) https://csgjustice
center.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ReducingRecidivism_StatesDeliverResults.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/Y4E3-DAHV] (describing a Pennsylvania “performance incentive funding 
model in which contractors work with [the department of corrections] establish baseline 
recidivism rates and then to review their recidivism rates every six months. Contractors can 
receive additional funds if they reduce recidivism below the baseline, or are at risk of having 
their contracts revoked if recidivism is above the baseline.”). 
 207 Sanya Mansoor, Different Ways of Measuring Recidivism Leads to Incomplete Data, 
Report Says, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Sep. 11, 2014), https://jjie.org/2014/09/11/different-
ways-of-measuring-recidivism-leads-to-incomplete-data-report-says/ [https://perma.cc/5JYN
-JJGU] (quoting MacArthur Foundation program officer quoting Patrick Griffin). 
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their participants improved and not just when they achieved perfection, 
program administrators might become willing to treat more serious offenders 
than they currently do.  These more serious or prolific criminals might go on 
to recidivate in some way but if the treatment they receive were to yield a 
measurable decrease in later offense severity and frequency, public safety 
would improve much more than if a minor offender is treated with a perfect 
result.  By removing the incentive for program administrators to focus their 
efforts on those least likely to recidivate, policymakers could encourage the 
development and expansion of programs that promote measurable desistance 
among those with whom they intervene. 
B. PREMATURE TERMINATION OF PROMISING PROGRAMS 
A second problem created by overreliance on recidivism rates is the risk 
that promising interventions may be prematurely declared failures.  If the 
only meaningful measure of a program’s success is the rate at which it 
reduces recidivism, programs that demonstrably promote desistance, but do 
not in themselves change recidivism rates, are at risk of termination. 
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that a sizeable 
percentage of people who undergo any criminal justice intervention will not 
recidivate.  This is not because the criminal justice system exerts a pervasive 
ameliorative influence, but rather because without intervention, most people 
who come into contact with the criminal justice system once will not do so 
again.208  As with any antisocial or maladaptive human behavior, crime can 
be habitual, periodic, or anomalous.  If the behavior is truly anomalous, then 
desistance is not necessary: the offender moves directly from crime to 
termination.  The behavior will not repeat, and no intervention is needed.209 
For those whose behavior is not anomalous, however, the process of 
desistance “resides somewhere in the interfaces between developing personal 
maturity, changing social bonds associated with certain life transitions, and 
the individual subjective narrative constructions which offenders build 
 
 208 By one estimate, approximately two-thirds of first-time state prisoners will not return 
to prison. Rosenfeld, supra note 113, at 313 (citing MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: 
SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 186–89 (2004)). A full 70% of juvenile 
arrestees will never be re-arrested. DAVID MACALLAIR & TIM ROCHE, WIDENING THE NET IN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THE DANGERS OF PREVENTION AND EARLY INTERVENTION, JUST. POL’Y 
INST. 5 (2001) http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/widening.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7
QE-RW7D] (“In other words, by doing nothing the state can achieve a 70 percent success 
rate—meaning no subsequent arrests—with first time offenders.”). 
 209 In fact, a developing body of literature suggests that formal criminal justice 
intervention in such cases may actually increase the risk of future criminal behavior. See D. 
A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and 
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1990). 
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around these key events and changes.”210  In light of the complex interplay 
between all of these factors, it is implausible to suggest that any one program 
or intervention—however well-conceived or delivered—can reliably 
transform persistent offenders into law-abiding citizens who will never again 
run afoul of the law. 
In reality, when a program claims to work dramatic changes in the 
recidivism rates of its program graduates, it is likely that those individuals 
did not need the program at all.211  A far more likely inference is that they 
were already far along the path of desistance because their criminal behavior 
was either anomalous or situational. 
But while dramatic claims of recidivism reduction should always be a 
cause for skepticism, the opposite is not always true.  If a program does not 
demonstrate its ability to significantly reduce recidivism rates, it is not 
necessarily a poor investment.  First, many programs have independent 
humanitarian value.  By providing convicted individuals with education, 
emotional support, skill development, or treatment for addiction and other 
challenges, the state recognizes the inherent dignity of those over whom it 
exercises control.212  Second, at least some of these programs likely play an 
important foundational role in fostering desistance. 
Consider the transtheoretical model of change.  Contemplation and 
preparation are necessary prerequisites to action in that model, but those early 
stages do not in themselves yield evidence of behavior change.213  Criminal 
justice programs that provide opportunities for individuals to imagine change 
where they previously could not or that assist individuals in devising plans 
for how to make needed changes will not always result in reduced rates of 
recidivism.  But by laying a foundation for later change, such programs may 
provide the necessary groundwork on which later progress will rest.  To 
identify such programs, it will be necessary to look for metrics more nuanced 
than pure recidivism: metrics that better reflect the realities of behavioral 
change and the influence that criminal justice interventions can have on 
promoting that change over time. 
Markers of desistance are a good start.  By examining the pattern of 
offending behavior that an individual displays over time, it is possible to 
discern whether a person’s criminal behavior is escalating or diminishing and 
whether it is gaining momentum or losing speed.  Each alteration provides 
 
 210 Fergus McNeill, A Desistance Paradigm for Offender Management, 6 CRIMINOLOGY 
& CRIM. JUST. 39, 47 (2006). 
 211 Cullen et al, supra, note 105. 
 212 FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 247–53 
(1982). 
 213 See Prochaska & Velicer, supra note 117, at 38–39. 
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an opportunity for intervention, whether by connecting a freshly-desisting 
young person with employment (a known pathway to long-term 
desistance214) or by offering a cognitive-behavioral intervention to a person 
whose behavior evinces a pattern of increasing entanglement with crime. 
C. RISK AVERSION 
Finally, overreliance on recidivism rates encourages risk aversive 
behavior by system actors, thus exacerbating mass incarceration and limiting 
opportunities for convicted individuals to master the skills that will 
ultimately lead to long-term desistance. 
The modern criminal justice system is risk averse by any measure.  Over 
the past half century, despite falling crime rates, criminal charges have 
increased.215  Sentences have lengthened.216  Parole and other forms of back-
end release have been significantly restricted.217  Revocations from 
community supervision have risen.218  Criminal justice bureaucrats are 
haunted by the fear that, on their watch, a released defendant, probationer, or 
parolee will commit a crime and wind up as front page news.219  The result 
is a paralyzed system. 
The emphasis that has been placed on recidivism rates and their 
reduction psychologically reinforces the idea that the job of the criminal 
justice system is to prevent crime at all costs, even if that means confining 
behind bars people whose conduct does not pose a serious risk of harm to 
others and those who have demonstrated that they are engaged in the process 
of behavioral change.  To the worried parole board member or probation 
officer, a system that rises and falls on recidivism rates alone is one in which 
any infraction, however small, counts as failure.  In such a world, it will 
always be easier to lock up the technical violator or never parole the model 
 
 214 See generally Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of 
Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 529 
(2000). 
 215 See JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION 130 (2018) 
(describing proliferation of criminal charges leveled by prosecutors). 
 216 Janice Williams, Serving Time: Average Prison Sentence in the U.S. is Getting Even 
Longer, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/prison-sentences-increased-
2017-jail-639952 [archive] [https://perma.cc/TY4D-LFSA]. 
 217 See NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DELAYING A SECOND CHANCE: 
THE DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR PAROLE ON LIFE SENTENCES (2017); Cecelia Klingele, The 
Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011). 
 218 See generally Klingele, supra note 81. 
 219 See, e.g., Jacob Rosenberg, Will Another High Profile Crime Derail Parole Reform?, 
ARK. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/arkansas/media-clips/will-another-
high-profile-crime-derail-parole-reform/ [https://perma.cc/2AXU-UCUF]. 
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inmate because such behaviors will always protect the political interests of 
agencies and administrators. 
If, instead, success were gauged by more holistic metrics—including 
markers of desistance—incentives would shift.  A chronic offender’s minor 
violation, coming after a long period of good behavior, would be a cause for 
attention but not necessarily alarm.  Relapse by a chronic drug offender 
would not be reason to declare treatment a failure if it reduced use and 
associated new crime.  Opportunities to celebrate success would increase for 
both individuals in the system and the criminal justice system itself.  Judges 
and prosecutors, too, might begin to ask more critical questions about 
defendants’ predicted risk of recidivism.  Instead of reflexively balking at a 
medium or high predicted risk of re-offense, system actors might ask 
important interpretive questions such as, “What is this offender at risk of 
doing?,” and “Does the evidence suggest that this person is on a path of 
persistence or desistance?” The answers to those questions would guide the 
use of predictive risk tools, placing recidivism risks into a larger, more 
holistic context that is likely to yield sentences that would better advance 
fairness and public safety. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD MARKERS OF DESISTANCE  
In an article on recidivism, Robert Weisberg mused: 
Perhaps we should not be asking whether a criminal recidivates or not, or whether 
recidivist acts occur or not. Perhaps we should not even be focusing on the frequency 
of recidivism for a person or a society . . . . [P]erhaps a better measure—or rough guide 
to a better measure—is to ask whether as a result of a state intervention the offender 
reoffends less frequently or less harmfully than he otherwise might, especially by 
comparison to the likely downward arc of criminality due to aging.220 
Indeed, given all that is known about how behavior change occurs and 
what the criminal justice system can do to help or hinder that change process, 
the present focus on recidivism rates misses the mark.  It is only by looking 
at the pattern of behavior revealed by recidivism data that those within and 
outside the criminal justice system can begin to see the ways in which 
criminal justice interventions may be promoting desistance and ways the in 
which they may be hindering it. 
Changing metrics of success from rates of recidivism to markers of 
desistance will leave many problems unresolved.  Like the simple recidivism 
data on which they draw, markers of desistance can reveal only what 
behavior has come to law enforcement attention, not what behavior is 
 
 220 Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures of Recidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 804 
(2014). 
2019] MEASURING CHANGE 817 
occurring on the streets and within homes.  The underlying data will still be 
skewed by inconsistencies in policing, charging, and correctional supervision 
practices, as is the case with recidivism data more generally.221  Moreover, 
and perhaps most importantly, markers of desistance will still fail to capture 
many of the more holistic ways in which the pro-social progress of those 
entangled in the criminal justice system might be measured.  Markers of 
desistance will not tell whether people are creating meaningful and healthy 
relationships; or whether they are gainfully employed and able to meet their 
basic human needs; whether they feel connected to their communities.222  
These markers of well-being are not easily quantifiable, but they are no less 
important measures of the ways in which criminal justice interventions may 
be improving—or worsening—the condition of those with whom they 
intervene. 
Nevertheless, in a world committed to measurement, there are better 
measurements than recidivism.  By attending to markers of desistance, 
policymakers and criminal justice system actors and administrators can begin 
to develop a significantly more nuanced picture of individual change over 
time and of the role that criminal justice interventions play in promoting or 
hindering that change pro817cess. 
 
 
 221 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 222 Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future of Reentry Reform, 20 
FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 76 (2007) (expressing concern that “the tendency to frame and evaluate 
reentry initiatives as solely, or even primarily, recidivism reduction measures” ignores “many 
important social welfare and social justice concerns implicated in the treatment of returning 
prisoners”). 
